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Introduction 
Immigration law is most well-known among law professors for its 
marked departure from mainstream U.S. constitutional law. First invoked 
125 years ago to shield the “Chinese exclusion laws”1 from judicial review, 
the plenary power doctrine in effect immunizes the substantive immigration 
judgments of Congress about which noncitizens to admit into, and deport 
from, the United States. Through the application of the doctrine, courts 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581 (1889). For cogent criticism of The Chinese Exclusion Case, see Louis Henkin, The 
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987). 
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have allowed the U.S. immigration laws to discriminate against noncitizens 
in ways that would be patently unconstitutional if the rights of U.S. citizens 
were at stake.2  
Slowly chipping away at the plenary power doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has increasingly protected the procedural due process rights of noncitizens 
facing removal from the country.3 Nevertheless, the core of the doctrine 
continues to protect the substantive immigration judgments of Congress 
from judicial review.4 The doctrine’s deviation from fundamental 
conceptions of constitutional review epitomizes what immigration law 
professors have characterized as “immigration exceptionalism.”5 
Commentators long have criticized the plenary power doctrine as being 
out of step with the revolution in constitutional law that took place over the 
twentieth century.6 Nonetheless, despite acting at various times to avoid the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2003) (analyzing the history of discrimination against people of color, 
women, political minorities, and other disfavored groups in the U.S. immigration laws). 
 3. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (1984) (analyzing the evolution of immigration law and showing its movement 
toward increasing constitutional protections for noncitizens). A well-known example of a 
modern decision of this variety is Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22 (1982),  in which the 
Supreme Court held that a lawful permanent resident who departed the United States for a 
brief period was entitled to a hearing comporting with Due Process before she could be 
denied return into the country.  
 4. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad 
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392-94 (1999); Rachel E. 
Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1965, 1981-89 (2013). Besides immunizing the substantive immigration judgments of 
Congress from judicial review, immigration exceptionalism also afflicts the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions permitting the consideration of race in the 
enforcement of the immigration laws. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, 
Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); Alfredo Mirandé, Is 
There a “Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?, 55 FLA. L. REV 365 (2003). The 
development of that form of immigration exceptionalism, its racially disparate impacts on 
communities of color, and similar developments in the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions 
are analyzed in Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the 
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); 
Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
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doctrine’s harsh impacts,7 the Supreme Court to this point has failed to 
eliminate, or substantially limit, the doctrine. Consequently, lower courts 
occasionally invoke the plenary power doctrine to justify deference to 
Congress and the executive branch in immigration matters.8   
Around the turn of the century, immigration scholars opined that the 
Court was on the verge of abrogating, or otherwise limiting, the plenary 
power doctrine.9 The events of September 11, 2001, however, abruptly 
ended talk of the doctrine’s demise. Indeed, when promulgating a 
regulation creating a program that required certain Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 701 (2005); Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal 
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425 (1997); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden 
Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965. 
 7. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36-37 (1982) (holding that lawful 
permanent resident seeking to return to the United States after a brief departure from the 
country was entitled to a hearing consistent with due process); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 
449, 462 (1963) (interpreting the U.S. immigration laws to avoid the question of the 
constitutionality of the prohibition or the admission of homosexuals). See generally Joseph 
Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 
879 (2015) (contending that Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence has produced a 
body of law weakening immigration and national security exceptionalism); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (analyzing reliance by the 
Supreme Court in immigration cases on procedural due process norms as “surrogates” for 
substantive constitutional protections to avoid harsh results); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (offering examples of the Court 
employing “phantom norms” in interpreting the immigration laws in order to avoid the 
application of the plenary power doctrine). For a capsule summary of “cracks” in the plenary 
power doctrine in the Supreme Court’s decisions, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. 
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 164-66 (5th ed. 2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and 
superseded by 788 F.3d 893 (2015); Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2011); Johnson 
v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Loaiza-Sanchez, 622 F.3d 
939, 941 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 9. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology 
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny 
of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 
1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). For skepticism about the claim that the end of the plenary power 
doctrine was imminent, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: 
A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000).  
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then-Attorney General John Ashcroft expressly invoked the plenary power 
doctrine to protect the facially discriminatory measure from the inevitable 
constitutional challenges; he emphasized matter-of-factly that “[t]he 
political branches of the government have plenary authority in the 
immigration area. In the context of immigration and nationality laws, the 
Supreme Court has particularly ‘underscore[d] the limited scope of judicial 
inquiry.’”10 Accepting the Attorney General’s assertions, courts rejected 
various constitutional challenges to the special registration program.11   
Security fears expanded beyond the events of September 11, 2001, and 
ultimately translated into calls for greater enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico 
border.12 The focus on public safety also appeared, at least temporarily, to 
subtly influence the Supreme Court’s approach to various immigration 
measures, including the detention of immigrants convicted of crimes.13 As 
worries about terrorism in the United States have receded with the passage 
of time since September 11, the aggressive push for extraordinary 
immigration enforcement measures has generally diminished.  
This Article posits that the trend in the Supreme Court’s contemporary 
immigration decisions suggests that the plenary power doctrine—the 
bedrock of immigration exceptionalism—is once again heading toward its 
ultimate demise. To test that thesis, the Article scrutinizes the Court’s 
immigration decisions, as well as some other actions, such as certiorari 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52584, 52585 
(Aug. 12, 2002) (emphasis added) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 702 (1977); Matthews 
v. Diaz, 476 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1976)). Special registration was one of a number of much-
criticized security measures directed at Arab and Muslim noncitizens after September 11. 
See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2005) (analyzing such measures); Susan M. Akram 
& Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: 
The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (to the same 
effect); Leti Volpp, The Citizens and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (same).  
 11. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 
447 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 12. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security 
After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 
1387 (2007). 
 13. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional 
Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343-45 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) 
(contending that the Supreme Court’s decision upholding mandatory detention of 
noncitizens convicted of certain crimes in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), was 
influenced by national security fears following September 11, 2001 and explained the 
decision’s departure from Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679 (2001), which was decided 
shortly before September 11).  
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denials in significant immigration cases, from the 2009 to the 2013 Terms. 
This period coincides with the first five years of the Obama presidency, 
during which time the executive branch has infrequently relied on the 
plenary power doctrine as a justification for its immigration positions.14 
The Supreme Court’s decisions reveal that, although it now reviews 
considerably fewer cases than it once did,15 immigration matters regularly 
comprise a bread-and-butter part of its docket. Indeed, the Court decided 
five immigration-related merits cases in the 2011 Term, which represents a 
large number for a specialty area of the law.16 Such a steady diet of 
immigration cases is consistent with the observation that it is an important 
national issue worthy of attention, and that the cases raise questions that go 
to the core of the modern administrative state. Considerable controversy has 
surrounded some of the immigration cases that have come before the 
Court,17 especially the much-publicized constitutional challenge to 
Arizona’s landmark immigration law known as SB 1070 and many other 
state and local efforts to push the federal government toward more vigorous 
enforcement of the immigration laws.18 What perhaps stands out most from 
the review of the five Terms is that a conservative Supreme Court, 
characterized by some observers as ideologically extreme,19 has 
consistently followed generally applicable legal principles in its 
immigration decisions. The Roberts Court’s immigration decisions indeed 
fit comfortably within the jurisprudential mainstream of its decisions in 
other substantive areas of law.20 The Court consistently has applied 
ordinary, standard, and unremarkable legal doctrines in ordinary, standard, 
and unremarkable ways. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 14. See infra Part VI (analyzing trends in Supreme Court’s immigration decisions and 
arguments made by the executive branch to the Court). 
 15. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and 
Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368-69 
(2006). 
 16. See infra Part III (analyzing decisions from the 2011 Term). 
 17. See infra Parts I-V. 
 18. See infra Parts III.A, IV.C, V.B. (discussing Supreme Court’s approaches in federal 
preemption cases). 
 19. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the 
Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 218 (2011). 
 20. See infra Parts I-V. 
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In addition, the Court has declined to stretch its ordinary rules to review 
immigration cases with decidedly political overtones,21 such as the growing 
number of cases evaluating the constitutionality of state and local 
immigration enforcement laws. Rather, in selecting immigration cases for 
review, the Court has adhered to its standard practice of resolving circuit 
splits and considering legal questions of national importance.22 It has 
denied certiorari and refused to review a number of cases involving 
politically charged state and local immigration measures.23 For now, the 
Court has allowed its two recent decisions on federal preemption of such 
laws to be applied by the lower courts. 
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has decided several 
cases dealing with the U.S. government’s efforts to remove from the 
country lawful permanent residents convicted of crimes.24 That 
development reflects Congress’s steady expansion of the criminal grounds 
for the removal of noncitizens combined with the dramatic increase in the 
U.S. government’s efforts at directing immigration enforcement at criminal 
noncitizens.25 
In response to the growing number of states attempting to “assist” in the 
enforcement of the federal immigration laws, the Court has shown keen 
interest in the constitutional distribution of power between the state and 
national governments.26 In consecutive Terms, the Court decided a pair of 
federal preemption cases squarely raising the constitutionality of 
immigration enforcement laws arising out of Arizona—ground zero in the 
heated national debate over immigration. Workmanlike in approach, the 
decisions clarified the relative spheres of federal versus state power with 
respect to modern immigration enforcement and reined in Arizona’s novel 
efforts (and, through its decision, similar moves by other state and local 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See infra Parts II.C.1., IV.C., V.B. 
 22. See, e.g., infra note 88 (noting that Court granted certiorari in Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder to resolve a circuit split). 
 23. See infra text Parts IV.C, V.B and accompanying text. 
 24. See, e.g., infra Parts I.B. (discussing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 
(2010)); IV.A (analyzing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013)). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 67-77. 
 26. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-09 (2012) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate component of the Affordable Care 
Act and rejecting challenges from several states); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (addressing federalism issues in holding that the Second Amendment applies to the 
states). 
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governments) to encroach upon the federal immigration enforcement 
power.27 
Analyzing the body of immigration decisions of the Supreme Court in 
the 2009-13 Terms, this Article concludes that the Court has, to a large 
extent, continued to bring U.S. immigration law into the jurisprudential 
mainstream. Consistent with its efforts over more than a decade to avoid 
deciding serious constitutional questions,28 the Court has interpreted the 
immigration laws in ways that allow it to bypass such questions and to not 
invoke the plenary power doctrine to shield constitutionally dubious 
statutes from judicial review.29 Thus, without eliminating the doctrine, the 
Court has silently moved away from anything that might be characterized 
as immigration exceptionalism. 
In applying U.S. immigration laws, both conservative and liberal 
Supreme Court Justices look first to the text of the comprehensive federal 
immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),30 and 
spend considerable time debating the proper interpretation of the often 
complex statutory provisions. The Justices frequently differ about the 
application of conventional legal doctrines to immigration cases, but rarely 
raise the considerably more controversial question whether conventional  
doctrines should apply at all to these cases. 
As those knowledgeable of contemporary developments in 
administrative law would suspect, the deference properly afforded the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a common battleground for 
advocates in the Supreme Court. The arguments on this important question 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See infra Parts II.A, III.A. 
 28. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (acknowledging the “strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” that requires “a clear 
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction” of a removal order); McNary 
v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding that, because Congress had not 
made a clear statement barring judicial review of class action, the Court would in a class 
action decide the lawfulness of the implementation of a program in the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986). Several other recent Supreme Court decisions have ensured 
judicial review of removal orders in the face of apparent congressional attempts to restrict, if 
not eliminate, judicial review. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003); 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). This pattern of constitutional avoidance in 
ensuring judicial review of immigration matters can be understood as an effort by the Court 
to avoid invoking the plenary power doctrine. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance 
in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008) (making similar observation in 
connection with litigation over the rights of enemy combatants).  
 29. See supra note 28 (citing authority). 
 30. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (as 
amended). 
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are central to modern administrative law, in which there is much debate 
over the proper degree of deference due administrative agencies. As in 
many substantive areas of law, the issue results in differences of opinion 
among the Justices in immigration cases.31 Arguments about agency 
deference are related to arguments about statutory interpretation because, 
under well-established administrative law doctrine, the Court frequently 
defers to what it determines to be reasonable agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes. It was rare for any Justice—much less a majority of the 
Court—to advocate for the kind of extreme deference embodied by the 
plenary power doctrine.32 
In applying conventional methods to immigration cases, the Court has on 
a regular basis—although not always—rejected the U.S. government’s 
positions. It therefore is difficult to convincingly contend that the Court 
consistently extends extreme, undue, or exceptional deference to the 
government’s immigration decision-making. Some commentators might 
even contend that the Court in some cases is less deferential to the agencies 
administering the immigration laws than what arguably is called for by 
general administrative law principles.33  
As we shall see, a Supreme Court on the conservative side of the 
ideological spectrum has consistently taken a lawyerly—some might say 
judicious—case-by-case approach to the judicial review of immigration 
decisions. It applies generally applicable legal doctrines in its review.34 
That development is unquestionably disappointing to advocates of an 
immigration jurisprudence more protective of immigrants.35 However, the 
trend in the Court’s decisions reflects what can be positively viewed as 
bringing immigration law more in line with conventional norms of judicial 
review. If the trend continues, the Court may ultimately relegate 
immigration exceptionalism, and the plenary power doctrine itself, to the 
history books, merely an artifact primarily of interest to legal historians.36 
This Article predicts that unduly deferential approaches will likely not 
return with regularity in the foreseeable future. Such approaches, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., infra Part III.B. 
 32. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s scathing 
dissent in part in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).  
 33. See infra Part III.B. (analyzing Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
476 (2011)). 
 34. See infra Part VI.A. 
 35. See infra Part VI.B. 
 36. See infra Part VI (summarizing the general trends in the Roberts Court’s 
immigration jurisprudence). 
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conceivably could return in truly exceptional cases, such as ones 
implicating an imminent mass migration37 or following another catastrophic 
act of terrorism. 
I. The 2009 Term 
In the 2009 Term, the Supreme Court extended a fundamental 
constitutional protection to noncitizens that has affected the vast majority of 
criminal prosecutions of noncitizens in the United States.38 The Court also 
decided two more ordinary immigration cases.39 Noncitizens prevailed in 
all three. 
A. Padilla v. Kentucky: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on 
Immigration Advice 
Addressing an issue that had been percolating in the lower federal and 
state courts,40 the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky held that a lawful 
permanent resident could base a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on an attorney’s alleged failure to accurately inform the 
defendant of the possible immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction—namely, possible removal from the United States.41  
                                                                                                                 
 37. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (rejecting legal 
challenges to U.S. government program in which the Coast Guard interdicted large numbers 
of Haitian migrants on the high seas before they could reach the shores of the United States 
and apply for relief from removal). For a time, the publicity over the “surge” of 
unaccompanied minors coming to the United States from Central America in 2014 
threatened to influence the Supreme Court’s approach to immigration matters. See Frances 
Robles, Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2014, at A1.  
The number of Central Americans coming to this country has diminished, however, along 
with the sense of urgency to respond. See Michael Muskal, Border Crossings by Children 
Decline as Immigration Debate Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/ la-na-immigration-numbers-2014114-story.html. 
 38. See Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions 
Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/does-the-crime-fit-the-punishment 
-recent-judicial-actions-expan.pdf (analyzing Padilla v. Kentucky and Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder, two immigration decisions from the 2009 Term) (last visited June 30, 2015). 
 39. See infra Parts I.B., C. 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005), abrogated by 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
2002), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Utah v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 
P.3d 930 (Utah 2005), abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 41. 559 U.S. 356, 374-75 (2010). 
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After pleading guilty to drug trafficking charges in Kentucky state court, 
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident for more 
than forty years with U.S. citizen children, faced removal from the 
country.42 He claimed that his criminal defense counsel failed to advise him 
of the likely deportation resulting from a drug conviction before he entered 
a guilty plea; Padilla in fact alleged that his counsel had affirmatively told 
him not to worry about removal, because he had lived in this country for so 
many years.43 Padilla contended that, had he been properly informed of the 
likelihood of removal resulting from the plea bargain, he would have taken 
his chances at trial.44  
Rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court affirmed Padilla’s criminal conviction.45 It reasoned that, 
because deportation is a civil matter and a mere “collateral” consequence of 
a criminal conviction, the Sixth Amendment does not protect criminal 
defendants from erroneous advice about the possible immigration 
consequences of a conviction.46 
In one of his last opinions before retirement, Justice Stevens wrote for a 
majority of the Court. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel to inform a noncitizen client that a plea carries the risk of 
deportation; consequently, Padilla had sufficiently alleged that his counsel’s 
representation was constitutionally deficient.47 In reaching that conclusion, 
the Court recognized that removal from the country is now virtually 
inevitable for many noncitizens convicted of crimes.48 Therefore, the 
receipt of accurate legal advice is more important than ever for noncitizens 
deciding whether to accept a plea deal.49 For many noncitizens, deportation 
is one of the most important parts of the total penalty that may flow from a 
criminal conviction.50  
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at 359. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
 46. See id. at 485. In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General filed a brief in support of 
affirmance of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-
651), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_ 
preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_651_AffirmanceAmCuUSA.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 47. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373-74. 
 48. Id. at 360. 
 49. Id. at 364. 
 50. Id. 
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The Court previously had held that the Sixth Amendment entitles a 
criminal defendant to “the effective assistance of competent counsel,” 
before he or she decides whether to plead guilty.51 In evaluating the merits 
of Padilla’s claim, the Court applied the generally applicable test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in its 1984 decision of Strickland 
v. Washington.52  
Disagreeing with the Kentucky Supreme Court, the majority emphasized 
that, in deciding the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel, it 
had never previously distinguished between “direct” and “collateral” 
consequences.53 The Court observed that, although removal proceedings are 
classified as civil matters, removal based on a criminal conviction is deeply 
intertwined with the modern criminal justice process. It thus is 
extraordinarily difficult to classify it as either a “direct” or “collateral” 
consequence of a criminal conviction.54 The Court further acknowledged 
that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that 
[criminal defense] counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation.”55 
The Court ultimately concluded that advice about possible removal from 
the United States is within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.56 Finding that Padilla had sufficiently 
alleged a constitutional violation, the Court remanded the case to the 
Kentucky courts for further proceedings to determine whether he had 
suffered the prejudice necessary to prevail under Strickland.57 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the 
judgment.58 He agreed with the majority that Padilla had established a 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 52. See id. at 366 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 53. Id. at 365. 
 54. Id. at 365-66. 
 55. Id. at 367 (citing, inter alia, Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713-
18 (2002)). 
 56. Id. at 374.  
 57. Id. at 369; see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 
695 (2011) (analyzing proof of prejudice required to prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky). On remand, the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky found that violation of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel prejudiced Padilla and vacated the conviction. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d 
322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).  
 58. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375 (Alito, J., concurring).  
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prima facie case of violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel.59 
Justice Alito, however, understood the right to be narrower than the 
majority did.60 In his view, the right to effective assistance of counsel 
should only protect criminal defendants from defense counsel who 
affirmatively provide them with incorrect legal advice on immigration 
matters (as Padilla alleged).61 For Justice Alito, the right would ordinarily 
be limited to requiring counsel to advise the noncitizen defendant of the 
possible need to consult an immigration attorney about the adverse 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction.62  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.63 The dissent 
emphatically disagreed with the majority that the effective assistance of 
counsel obligation under the Sixth Amendment extended to what he insisted 
were merely “collateral” civil consequences, including the possible 
immigration consequences, of a criminal conviction.64 
All of the justices on the Court decided Padilla’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment through the application of 
generally applicable precedent, even though the case involved a noncitizen 
defendant. In so doing, the majority brought removal-related advice under 
the purview of the general right to effective assistance of counsel.  
Padilla v. Kentucky is one of the most significant decisions affecting the 
rights of immigrants in the United States in decades.65 Although only 
decided in 2010, the decision has already generated a voluminous body of 
scholarly commentary.66 The far-reaching practical impacts of the decision 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See id. at 384-88. 
 63. Id. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 64. See id. at 389-90. 
 65. See infra note 66 (citing authorities). 
 66. See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of 
Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating 
the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 
1117, 1118 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical 
Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21; César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández, Criminal Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 476 
(2012); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty 
for Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 847 (2013); Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the 
Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses Fundamental Fairness and Leaves 
Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 32 (2012); Daniel 
Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging 
Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2011); 
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in no small part result from the U.S. government’s increasingly aggressive 
efforts to deport “criminal aliens.”67 Virtually every noncitizen plea 
agreement—a central part of the contemporary criminal justice system68—
                                                                                                                 
Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553, 563-71 (2013); Anita 
Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on 
Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across the Border?, 45 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 327, 328 (2011); Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. 
Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 
354 (2011); Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants 
Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 169, 170 (2011); Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal 
Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2011); Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. 
Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful 
Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012); Joanna Rosenberg, Note, A Game Changer? 
The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the Collateral Consequences Rule and Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2013); see also Christopher 
N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132 (2014) (stating that Padilla recognized 
“the right to effective crimmigration counsel–the right to effective advice concerning the 
potential immigration consequences of a criminal conviction”) (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, ET AL., COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013) 
(summarizing law concerning collateral consequences of criminal convictions).  
 67. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
75 (2013); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Allegra M. 
McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 367 (2006); Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing 
Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 494-512 (2011); Yolanda 
Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the 
Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639 
(2011).  
 68. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 
(2012): 
The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of 
the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea 
bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate 
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process 
at critical stages. Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a 
system of trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial 
as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large 
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines 
who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not 
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has immigration consequences and, as such, is subject to the mandate of the 
Court’s ruling. 
B. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder: Removal for Misdemeanor Drug 
Possession69 
The immigration statute makes lawful permanent residents convicted of 
an “aggravated felony”70 ineligible for a form of relief from removal known 
as “cancellation of removal.”71 Such relief, if granted, permits the 
noncitizen to lawfully remain in the United States. Over the last several 
decades, Congress has progressively expanded the definition of an 
aggravated felony and thus subjected growing numbers of immigrants 
convicted of crimes to mandatory detention and removal.72 The trend 
reflects the political unpopularity in Congress of noncitizens convicted of 
crimes, as well as the consistent popularity of tough enforcement measures 
directed at immigrants.73 
                                                                                                                 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” 
 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 69. A preview of the issues raised by this case can be found in Kevin R. Johnson & 
Raha Jorjani, Only in Immigration Law and in Alice in Wonderland: Aggravated 
Misdemeanors?, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www. 
acslaw.org/acsblog/node/15775. 
 70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). 
 71. See id. § 1229b(a)(3). 
 72. As one commentator summarized the evolution of the definition of an “aggravated 
felony,” 
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal category in 1988, 
only three serious crimes were included: murder, drug trafficking, and firearms 
trafficking. The current list—now at twenty-eight offenses, some of which 
create further sub-categories—includes crimes that are neither aggravated nor 
felonies under criminal law. Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year 
sentence can qualify as an aggravated felony, as does a year of probation with a 
suspended sentence for pulling hair—a misdemeanor under Georgia law. 
Convictions for selling ten dollars worth of marijuana, theft of a ten-dollar 
video game, shoplifting fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and forging a 
check for less than twenty dollars have all been held to be aggravated felonies. 
Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory detention, deportation without the 
possibility of almost all forms of discretionary relief, including asylum and 
cancellation of removal, and a permanent bar on lawful reentry.  
Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-59 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
 73. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of 
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1531-34 (1995); 
see, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-19 (2003) (describing congressional findings of 
high level of criminal activity among noncitizens); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 713 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
72 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:57 
 
 
With congressional expansion of the criminal grounds for removal, 
combined with the executive branch’s increased removal efforts directed at 
noncitizens convicted of crimes,74 the U.S. government now removes from 
the country approximately 400,000 immigrants each year.75 Many are 
lawful permanent residents convicted of relatively minor criminal 
offenses.76 As one commentator has aptly observed, “[t]he deportation of 
‘criminal aliens’ is now the driving force in American immigration 
enforcement. . . . In effect, federal immigration enforcement has become a 
criminal removal system.”77 
In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,78 the Court held that Carachuri-
Rosendo’s second minor drug possession offense did not constitute an 
aggravated felony and therefore could not serve as grounds for automatic 
removal of a lawful permanent resident. It specifically addressed the 
question whether a state misdemeanor conviction for drug possession may 
amount to an aggravated felony under the U.S. immigration laws.79 A 
lawful permanent resident with four U.S. citizen children, Jose Angel 
Carachuri-Rosendo immigrated to the United States from Mexico in 1993.80 
He subsequently was convicted for (1) misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana, for which he received a twenty-day jail sentence, and (2) 
misdemeanor possession of one tablet of a prescription drug (Xanax), for 
                                                                                                                 
(2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing data showing high rates of recidivism among 
noncitizen criminals). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73. 
 75. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 
OPERATIONS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 1 (2014), available at https://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf.  
 76. See Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the 
Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 
35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 865 (1998); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 
1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1936, 1942 (2000). 
 77. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local 
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 78. 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010).  
 79. Id. A difference of opinion exists on the question whether the courts should defer to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) interpretation of “aggravated felony,” in light of 
the fact that the Board’s expertise is in immigration, not criminal, law. See Michael 
Dorfman-Gonzalez, Note, Chevron’s Flexible Agency Expertise Model: Applying the 
Chevron Doctrine to the BIA’s Interpretation of the INA’s Criminal Law—Based 
Aggravated Felony Provision, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 976-77 (2013).  
 80. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S at 570.  
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which he received a ten-day sentence.81 His two relatively minor drug 
possession convictions suggest that Carachuri-Rosendo was little more than 
a small-time drug offender.  
Federal law provides that, when a person is convicted of possessing a 
controlled substance after a previous drug conviction, the prosecutor may 
seek what is known as a “recidivist enhancement,” which converts the 
second misdemeanor into a felony conviction.82 To secure such an 
enhancement, the prosecutor must comply with a number of procedural 
safeguards designed to protect the defendant.83  
The prosecutor failed to pursue a recidivist enhancement in Carachuri-
Rosendo’s second drug possession prosecution.84 Nonetheless, the 
immigration court reasoned that, because Carachuri-Rosendo could have 
been prosecuted for a felony, he effectively had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and, thus, was not eligible for cancellation of removal.85 
The BIA agreed.86 The court of appeals denied Carachuri-Rosendo’s 
petition for review of the removal order.87 To resolve a conflict among the 
circuits,88 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
In another opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that Carachuri-
Rosendo’s second minor drug possession offense did not constitute an 
aggravated felony and, thus, could not serve as grounds for automatic 
removal.89 The Court found that, unless the second conviction is in fact 
based on a prior conviction (and the recidivist enhancement procedure 
followed), a misdemeanor drug possession offense cannot constitute an 
aggravated felony.90  
The Court reasoned that the U.S. government’s position ignored the plain 
language of the INA, which only prohibits the award of cancellation of 
removal when a noncitizen “has . . . been convicted of a[n] aggravated 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 570-71.  
 82. See id. at 568 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2006)). 
 83. Id. at 567-69. 
 84. See id. at 563. 
 85. See In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 394 (BIA 2007). 
 86. See id. at 390-94. 
 87. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 570 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 560 
U.S. 563 (2010). 
 88. Compare id. (holding that state conviction for simple drug possession after prior 
conviction for simple possession is a felony under the Controlled Substances Act and 
therefore an aggravated felony under the immigration laws), with Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 
F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2008) (reaching a contrary conclusion). 
 89. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 581-82.  
 90. See id. at 582.  
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felony.”91 The Court further observed that one does not ordinarily think of a 
ten-day sentence for unauthorized possession of a single prescription pill as 
an aggravated felony.92 Citing 2004 precedent, the Court noted that courts 
should construe any ambiguities in criminal statutes cross-referenced in the 
immigration laws in favor of the noncitizen, a variation of the time-honored 
rule of lenity historically applied to the interpretation of penal laws.93  
Justices Scalia94 and Thomas95 each separately concurred in the 
judgment. Both Justices agreed with the holding of the majority. Each, 
however, would have reached the conclusion through slightly different 
analyses of the statutory text and relevant precedent.96  
In sum, the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder engaged in 
unremarkable statutory interpretation of the immigration laws and rejected 
the U.S. government’s reading of the statute.97 A majority of the Court 
relied on a variant of the rule of lenity to interpret statutory ambiguities in 
favor of Carachuri-Rosendo and to find him eligible for relief from 
removal.98 The Justices unanimously agreed on the ultimate disposition of 
the case.  
Following standard practice,99 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
vacated the judgments, and remanded for further consideration eighteen 
cases raising similar issues in light of its decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder.100 The relatively large number of cases subject to the Court’s ruling 
is a by-product of the Obama administration’s concentrated efforts to 
remove noncitizens with criminal convictions.101 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 576 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006)) (alteration in original). 
 92. See id. at 564. 
 93. See id. at 581 (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). 
 94. Id. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (citing concurring opinions). 
 97. For analysis of the Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, see Asher 
Steinberg, Supreme Court Holds That a Finding of Recidivism Must Be Made in Court of 
Conviction for Repeat Offenses to Qualify as Recidivist Offenses When Ruling on 
Applications for Cancellations of Removal, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 539 (2011); Inna 
Zazulevskaya, Comment, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder: To Be Deemed Convicted of an 
Aggravated Felony, an Actual Conviction Is Required, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1215 (2011).  
 98. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 576-80.  
 99. See Sena Ku, Comment, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: Drawing a Line 
Between Deference and Control, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 383 (2008) (reviewing Court’s grants of 
certiorari, vacation of judgments, and remands).  
 100. See Supreme Court Grants Cert, Vacates Judgments in Eighteen Cases in Light of 
Carachuri-Rosendo, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1287 (June 28, 2010).  
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77. 
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C. Kucana v. Holder: Judicial Review of Motions to Reopen 
Having overslept, Agron Kucana, who entered the country on a business 
visa but stayed after it expired, missed his removal hearing in the 
immigration court; at that hearing, he would have had the opportunity to 
produce evidence in support of asylum and withholding-of-removal claims 
based on his alleged fear of persecution if he were returned to his native 
country of Albania.102 The immigration court in absentia ordered Kucana 
removed from the United States.103 As authorized by regulation,104 he filed 
a motion to reopen the proceedings to seek relief from removal.105 The 
immigration court and Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion.106  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by 
Chief Judge Easterbrook, dismissed the petition for review of the denial of 
the motion to reopen for lack of jurisdiction; the court based the dismissal 
on 1996 amendments to the immigration laws that greatly limited judicial 
review of the discretionary judgments of the Attorney General.107 Judge 
Cudahy dissented, asserting that the majority opinion “giv[es] the executive 
branch the authority to insulate its decisions from judicial review where 
there is no clear indication in the statute that Congress intended to strip us 
of our jurisdiction.”108 To resolve a conflict among the circuits, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.109  
Taking an exceedingly rare step, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan 
refused to defend the lower court’s holding that the court lacked jurisdiction 
to review the denial of the motion to reopen.110 Her refusal to defend the 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 239-40 (2010). In the seminal case of INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Court delineated the relative burdens of proving 
claims to asylum and withholding of removal.  
 103. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 240.  
 104. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2014). 
 105. Kucana, 558 U.S. at 240.  
 106. Id.  
 107. See Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 108. Id. at 540 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
 109. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 241. For circuits reaching conclusions contrary to that of 
the Seventh Circuit, see Jahjaga v. Attorney General, 512 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2008); Singh v. 
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2005); 
Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359 (10th Cir. 2004); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 
F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2004). The Obama administration also later refused to defend a court of 
appeals ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to review equitable tolling of the deadline to file a 
motion to reopen. See Mata v. Holder, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
 110. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 241-42. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
76 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:57 
 
 
lower court ruling unquestionably signaled to the Supreme Court the 
vulnerability of the decision and foreshadowed the ultimate outcome of the 
case.111 The Court appointed a law professor to defend the court of appeals’ 
decision.112  
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, which was 
joined by all of the Justices except Justice Alito.113 The Court 
acknowledged that a motion to reopen removal proceedings is an 
“‘important safeguard’” for noncitizens facing removal.114 In the Court’s 
estimation, the language of the statute, relevant legislative and regulatory 
history, and the longstanding presumption favoring judicial review of 
administrative action115 all favored judicial review of the denial of a motion 
to reopen the removal proceedings.116 The Court relied on the plain 
language of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996.117 The statute expressly barred the review of the discretionary 
judgments by the Attorney General, not discretionary decisions delegated 
by regulation by the Attorney General to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.118  
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id.  
 112. See id. The Court appointed Professor Amanda Leiter of Washington College of 
Law at American University as counsel to defend the lower court ruling. Id. 
 113. Id. at 236. 
 114. Id. at 242 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18 (2008) (citation omitted)). The 
Court previously had afforded considerable deference to the judgment of the BIA in 
reviewing motions to reopen. See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); INS v. 
Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 146 (1981). Lower courts frequently found that the Court’s decisions 
generally required broad deference to the rulings of the Board. See, e.g., Jara-Navarrette v. 
INS, 813 F.2d 1340, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986); Hamid v. INS, 648 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 115. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 251-52 (citing, inter alia, Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)). 
 116. See id. at 243-53. For analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. 
Holder, see Michelle R. Slack, No One Agrees . . . But Me? An Alternative Approach to 
Interpreting the Limits on Judicial Review of Procedural Motions and Requests for 
Discretionary Immigration Relief After Kucana v. Holder, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2011); 
Michael A. Keough, Note, Kucana v. Holder and Judicial Review of the Decision Not to 
Reopen Sua Sponte in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 
passim (2012). 
 117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (as amended by the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) (providing that discretionary “action of 
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security” is not subject to judicial 
review) (emphasis added). 
 118. See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 252. 
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Contending the Court should have decided the case on narrower statutory 
and regulatory grounds, Justice Alito concurred in the judgment.119 Thus, 
the Justices unanimously rejected the court of appeals’s conclusion that 
motions to reopen were not subject to judicial review under the 1996 
immigration reform legislation. 
The Supreme Court in Kucana v. Holder therefore held that courts of 
appeals continue to have jurisdiction under the 1996 reforms to review 
denials of motions to reopen removal proceedings by the BIA.120 This 
holding builds on the Court’s line of decisions ensuring the judicial review 
of removal decisions in the face of increasingly stringent congressional 
restrictions. 
It unquestionably would have represented a major change in the law if 
the Supreme Court had eliminated the long-established judicial authority to 
review motions to reopen removal proceedings. Noncitizens subject to 
removal from the United States regularly file motions to reopen, seeking 
among other things, to present new evidence in support of claims for relief 
from removal.121 Rather than taking what would have been an extraordinary 
step of uncertain constitutionality, the Court cautiously opted to protect the 
right to judicial review—a holding in tension with the plenary power 
doctrine’s immunity from judicial scrutiny—and ensured the possibility for 
courts to correct erroneous action by the executive branch. The Court 
adhered to the general presumption favoring judicial review of agency 
action. Congress, of course, could intervene to foreclose judicial review of 
motions to reopen, but has not yet done so. 
II. The 2010 Term 
In the 2010 Term, the Supreme Court decided the first of two cases from 
Arizona in consecutive Terms raising the contentious issue of state versus 
federal power over immigration enforcement.122 Even though recognizing 
federal primacy over immigration regulation, the Court relied on the plain 
language of the statutory provision in question to conclude that federal 
immigration law did not preempt the Arizona law.123  
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. at 253 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 120. See id. at 237; see, e.g., INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94 (1988); INS. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 
(1981). 
 121. See supra note 120 (citing a series of Supreme Court motion to reopen decisions). 
 122. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  
 123. See infra Part II.A. 
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In a rare occurrence, the Term also saw a deadlocked Court affirm the 
refusal of a court of appeals to invalidate what amounts to discrimination 
based on gender stereotypes in the nationality laws.124 The fact that the 
Court was evenly split on the question suggests that the plenary power 
doctrine—which the case implicated and which, if invoked, would have 
barred judicial review—is in jeopardy. A near-majority of the Court, which 
would likely have been a majority if Justice Kagan had not recused 
herself,125 appears to be ready to limit, if not eliminate, the scope of the 
doctrine. 
In two cases involving state and local laws touching on immigration, the 
Court took actions that, although not deciding the merits, followed its 
generally applicable practices.126  
A. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Federal Preemption of a State 
Immigration Enforcement Law 
In 1986, Congress passed a major immigration reform bill; the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) sought to deter 
undocumented immigration by expressly prohibiting the employment of 
undocumented immigrants.127 The Act allows the imposition of civil 
penalties, known as “employer sanctions,” on employers who violate the 
proscription.128 IRCA expressly preempts “any State or local law imposing 
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, 
unauthorized aliens.”129  
                                                                                                                 
 124. See infra Part II.B. 
 125. Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. at 2312.   
 126. See infra Part II.C. 
 127. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)). 
 128. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2012). The adverse impacts of employer sanctions, 
including increased discrimination against national origin minorities, have been the subject 
of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of 
Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 389 
(1994) (concluding that the elimination of employer sanctions is the most expedient way to 
remedy the increased racial discrimination caused by their enforcement); Huyen Pham, The 
Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 780-82 (2008) (analyzing the 
ineffectiveness of employer sanctions and the national origin discrimination against lawful 
workers resulting from their enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment 
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195 
(arguing that employer sanctions regime has failed to deter undocumented immigration). 
 129. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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In an effort to improve the ability of employers to comply with the 
employer sanctions provisions, Congress in 1996 authorized the creation of 
E-Verify, an internet-based system that allows employers to verify the work 
authorization status of employees and job applicants.130 The law also 
prohibits the U.S. government from mandating any person or entity 
(including the states) other than the federal government to use E-Verify.131  
In a purported effort to facilitate immigration enforcement, the Arizona 
legislature in 2007 passed the Arizona Legal Workers Act.132 It provides for 
the suspension or revocation of the licenses of Arizona businesses that 
knowingly and intentionally employ undocumented immigrants.133 The Act 
further requires employers in Arizona to utilize the federal E-Verify 
database.134  
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various 
business and civil rights organizations challenged the constitutionality of 
the Arizona Legal Workers Act. They argued that federal immigration law 
preempted its provisions. Both the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit rejected the challenges.135 Before the Supreme Court, 
the Solicitor General filed a brief registering support of the U.S. 
government for the federal preemption position advocated by the Chamber 
of Commerce.136 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). The accuracy of the E-Verify database has been 
questioned. See WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION 114 (2009), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-
Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf; Emily Patten, Note, E-Verify During a Period of 
Economic Recovery and High Unemployment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 475, 482-83; see also T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2008) (“There is no clear way to fix employer sanctions 
anytime soon. The widely discussed ‘smart cards’ or ‘swipe cards’ will be years in the 
making. Meanwhile, massive work will need to be done on government databases to clean 
up misspelled, duplicate, and false names.”) (citation omitted). 
 131. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act §§ 402(a),(e), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
 132. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2014).  
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. § 23-212(I). 
 135. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp.2d 1036, 1045 (D. Ariz. 2008).  
 136. See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115), available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_0
9_10_09_115_PetitionerAmCuUSA.authcheckdam.pdf. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
80 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:57 
 
 
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,137 the Supreme Court, in a 
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that federal 
immigration law did not preempt the Arizona law. Although reiterating that 
the “‘[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably . . . a federal 
power,’”138 the Court held that IRCA’s preemption provision expressly 
preserves state authority to impose sanctions on employers of 
undocumented immigrants “through licensing and similar laws”; it thus was 
not expressly preempted.139 A plurality of the Court also found that the 
Arizona licensing law was not impliedly preempted by federal law.140 
The Court further concluded that federal immigration law did not 
preempt Arizona’s E-Verify mandate.141 In reaching that conclusion, the 
majority reasoned that the fact that the statute expressly prohibits the 
federal government from mandating use of E-Verify by private employers 
does not mean that the states cannot do so.142  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.143 Justice 
Sotomayor dissented separately.144 The analysis of the two dissents differed 
from the majority primarily with respect to the interpretation and 
application of IRCA’s preemption provision to the Arizona Legal Workers 
Act.145  
Whiting is a narrowly drawn decision dealing with the interpretation and 
application of the language of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 
The Court carefully adhered to the plain meaning of the statute, which 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011). Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. See id. 
 138. Id. at 1974 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)) (emphasis added).  
 139. Id. at 1977-81 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012)).  
 140. See id. at 1981-85. 
 141. See id. at 1985-86. 
 142. See id. at 1985. 
 143. See id. at 1987 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer expressed concern with the 
possible civil rights impacts of the Arizona Legal Workers Act on Latina/o workers resulting 
from its heightened penalties for the employment of undocumented immigrants, which 
included suspension and possible loss of a business license. See id. at 1061-26; see also 
supra note 128 and accompanying text (citing authorities expressing concern that employer 
sanction provisions contribute to national origin discrimination). 
 144. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In Mohawk Indus., Inc. 
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009), Justice Sotomayor employed the term 
“undocumented immigrants” for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion.  See Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the Decision of 
Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J. F. 499 (2014) (analyzing Justice Sotomayor’s 
immigration opinions on the court of appeals and Supreme Court). 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 137-44.  
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expressly preserves state authority to exercise the licensing power to 
facilitate enforcement of the employer sanctions provisions of the federal 
immigration laws. In so doing, the Court declined to find that the Arizona 
Legal Workers Act impermissibly infringed on the federal power to 
regulate immigration.146 A majority of the Court applied a conventional 
reading of the text of the statute to find that federal immigration law did not 
preempt the Arizona law.  
A number of commentators expressed concern that the decision in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting signaled the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to uphold other more aggressive state and local immigration 
enforcement measures.147 The Court’s refusal to disturb the Arizona law 
appears to have encouraged state legislatures to enact increasingly strict 
immigration enforcement laws.148 Nonetheless, the Whiting decision 
employed a straightforward federal preemption analysis based on a plain 
meaning interpretation of the statutory provision in question. The analysis 
is clearly within the jurisprudential mainstream. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977-81. 
 147. See Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The “Arizonification” of Immigration Law: Implications 
of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting for State and Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 85, 117 (2012); see also Gregory Delassus, Note, Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting and the Future of State Immigration Laws, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 613, 614 (2012) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court [in Whiting] should have reversed existing precedents and secured 
control of immigration law at the Federal level. Such an outcome would have prevented 
further impractical immigration restrictions, created a more uniform and predictable frame of 
reference for employers’ immigration questions, and enhanced compliance with the law.”); 
Keelan Diana, Comment, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting: The Possibility of Anti-
Discriminatory Immigration Reform in an Era of Resurgent Federalism, 12 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 196, 199 (2012) (“In an era of extreme anti-immigrant 
sentiment, Whiting signifies not only that the Supreme Court will allow states to perform 
functions that have traditionally fallen within the purview of the federal government, but 
more importantly that the Court may be willing to tolerate states like Arizona and Alabama 
enacting even more harmful legislation.”) (emphasis added); Krystal D. Norton, Note, 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Why the States Are Permitted to Pass a Tidal Wave of 
New State Laws So Dangerously Intertwined with Federal Immigration Law, 57 LOY. L. 
REV. 673, 675 (2011) (“In Whiting, the Court . . . started the ball rolling on allowing states to 
pass more restrictive statutes on the basis of U.S. immigration status.”). 
 148. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to 
Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 617 (2012) (contending that the enactment of 
increasing numbers of state and local immigration enforcement laws had potential negative 
civil rights implications for Latina/os). 
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B. Flores-Villar v. United States: The Plenary Power Doctrine and Gender 
Distinctions in the Nationality Laws 
In United States v. Flores-Villar,149 the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
constitutional challenge to a federal law that established different standards 
for obtaining U.S. citizenship for children born outside of the United States 
to unmarried parents, depending on whether the child’s mother or father 
was a U.S. citizen; the law favored mothers over fathers with respect to 
bestowing citizenship on children.150 An equally divided four-four Court, 
with Justice Kagan recusing herself, deadlocked, thereby affirming the 
court of appeals’ ruling that upheld the gender distinction in the nationality 
law.151 
Flores-Villar is one of several occasions in recent years in which the 
Supreme Court has grappled with the constitutionality of gender-based 
distinctions in the immigration and nationality laws.152 The Court has not 
hesitated to invalidate similar distinctions based on gender stereotypes in 
other laws.153 Such distinctions, however, remain in several provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which the plenary power doctrine 
historically has shielded from meaningful constitutional review.154  
The fact that the Supreme Court was equally divided in Flores-Villar 
places in doubt the future vitality of the plenary power doctrine, which is 
                                                                                                                 
 149. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994-98 (9th Cir. 2008). For criticism of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see Eric Newhouse, Note, “He’s Not Your Real Dad”: In 
United States v. Flores-Villar, The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Denied Equal Protection that 
Would Enable a Father to Transmit United States Citizenship to His Foreign-Born Child, 45 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 581 (2012). 
 150. See Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994-95 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409 (1976)).  
 151. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011). 
 152. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-62, 73 (2001) (upholding U.S. citizenship 
provision favoring illegitimate children of naturalized mothers over fathers); Miller v. 
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1998) (refusing to invalidate a similar gender-based 
distinction in nationality laws). For analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in this area, see 
generally Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at 
Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405 (2013); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus 
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2134 (2014); Nina Pillard, Comment, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A 
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835 (2002); Jessica Portmess, Comment, 
Until the Plenary Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of the Defense of Marriage Act in 
Immigration After Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1825 (2012). 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (striking down 
Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admission policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (invalidating university’s single-sex admission policy).  
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11. 
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the bedrock of immigration exceptionalism. At least four Justices 
apparently would not have applied the doctrine to protect the law in 
question from judicial review and would have struck down the gender-
based distinction. Although speculation about the votes of Justices is 
hazardous at best, the Justice who recused herself, Elena Kagan, might well 
be expected to side in the future, as she often does, with the Court’s more 
liberal Justices.155  
C. Federal Preemption of State and Local Immigration Enforcement Laws  
Besides the merits decisions of the 2010 Term, the Supreme Court took 
notable action in two cases addressing the lawfulness of state and local laws 
touching on immigration. 
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Federal Preemption of a Local 
Immigration Enforcement Ordinance 
In light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,156 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded a court of appeals decision 
striking down, on federal preemption grounds, much of a controversial 
ordinance that the Hazleton, Pennsylvania city council passed in the name 
of facilitating immigration enforcement.157 The council passed the 
ordinance after heated public debate marred by palpable expression of anti-
Latina/o sentiment.158 Along with other immigration enforcement-oriented 
measures, the Hazleton ordinance would have, among other things, 
prohibited landlords from renting housing to undocumented immigrants.159 
The ordinance was one of the plethora of state and local immigration 
enforcement laws passed in the early years of the new millennium that 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See Adam Liptak, With Eyes on His Vote in Health Subsidies Case, Roberts Lets on 
Little, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at A17 (reiterating the view that, based on voting patterns, 
Justice Kagan is one of the liberal members of the current Supreme Court). 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
 157. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176-81, 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2010), 
vacated by City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
 158. See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 209 n.31. 
 159. For analysis of legal issues raised by the challenge to the Hazleton ordinance, see 
Jamie Longazel & Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Exploiting Borders: The Political Economy of 
Local Backlash Against Undocumented Immigrants, 30 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 43 (2011); 
Rachel E. Morse, Following Lozano v. Hazleton: Keep States and Cities Out of the 
Immigration Business, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 513 (2008) (book review); Mark S. Grube, 
Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling 
Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2010). 
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signaled increasing public frustration with federal immigration 
enforcement.160 
When issues raised in a petition for certiorari are similar to those recently 
decided by the Court, the Supreme Court routinely grants certiorari, 
vacates, and remands the lower court decision for further consideration in 
light of the new decision.161 The Court in the Hazleton case followed its 
standard practice and vacated and remanded the court of appeals’s decision 
in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.162 Some commentators read 
the Court’s action as suggesting that the Court in the future might be 
willing to approve more aggressive state and local immigration 
enforcement measures.163 Such a development would signify a deviation 
from past practice and represent an arguably extreme change in the law.164 
  
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617 (explaining how the changing regional 
demographics of immigration and tightening state and local budgets contributed to the 
enactment of a record number of state and local immigration laws); supra text 
accompanying note and note 147 (mentioning commentators who feared that the Supreme 
Court decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting would result in an increase in state and 
local efforts to enforce the U.S. immigration laws); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, 2010 IMMIGRATION-RELATED BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES 
(JANUARY-MARCH 2010), at 1 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://ncsl.org/portals/1/ 
documents/immig/immigration_report_april2010.pdf (“With federal immigration reform 
currently stalled in Congress, state legislatures continue to tackle immigration issues at an 
unprecedented rate.”). See generally STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014) (collecting 
essays analyzing the propriety of increased state and local immigration enforcement). 
 161. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (mentioning how the Court vacated 
and remanded the rulings in eighteen cases in light of its decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder). 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 147-148. The fear that Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting would open the door to courts upholding state and local immigration enforcement 
laws proved to be unfounded. On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding 
that federal immigration law preempted the core provisions of the Hazleton ordinance. See 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court subsequently denied the 
City of Hazleton’s petition for certiorari and declined to review the court of appeals decision 
invalidating much of the city ordinance. See City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. 1491 
(2014); infra Part V.B.1. 
 164. See supra Part II.A.  
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2. Martinez v. Regents of the University of California: Public University 
Fees for Undocumented Residents 
In Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, the California 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge under federal law 165 to a 
state law 166 that allows certain graduates of California high schools, 
including undocumented immigrants, to pay the same fees as state residents 
to attend the University of California, state universities, and community 
colleges.167 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.168 
The California Supreme Court decision rested on the interpretation of 
federal law and garnered considerable public attention.169 Nonetheless, the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to disturb the court’s ruling. That refusal 
suggests that the Court is reluctant to interfere in decisions generally 
reserved to the states, such as those concerning the fees that state public 
colleges and universities charge to undocumented residents, including 
immigrant students.170  
  
                                                                                                                 
 165. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012) (“[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United 
States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within in a state (or a political 
subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the 
United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) 
without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.”).  
 166. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2014). Through this and other laws, California in 
recent years has sought to improve access of undocumented students to California public 
colleges and universities. See CALIFORNIA DREAM ACT OF 2011 BILL ANALYSIS 1-6 (2011), 
available at http://www.legin fo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-
0150/ab_130_cfa_20110607_133225_sen_comm.html; see also California DREAM Act, 
A.B. 130, 2011-12 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (making undocumented California residents eligible to 
receive scholarships derived from nonfederal funds). 
 167. Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010). 
For analysis of the Martinez decision, see Kyle William Colvin, Note, In-State Tuition and 
Illegal Immigrants: An Analysis of Martinez v. Regents of the University of California, 2010 
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 391; Beverly N. Rich, Note, Tracking AB 540’s Potential Resilience: 
An Analysis of In-State Tuition for Undocumented Students in Light of Martinez v. Regents 
of the University of California, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2010). 
 168. Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011). 
 169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (citing federal statute). 
 170. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the 
Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 108-29 (2008). But see Toll v. Moreno, 
458 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1982) (holding that federal law barred state of Maryland from denying in-
state resident fees at a public university to lawfully admitted nonimmigrant students). 
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III. The 2011 Term 
The 2011 Term saw the Supreme Court decide five immigration cases, a 
relatively large number for one Term. In one of the most important 
immigration decisions in years, the Court in Arizona v. United States171 
ruled in a rather unremarkable, workmanlike way to reinforce federal 
supremacy over immigration enforcement and invalidate core provisions of 
a controversial Arizona immigration enforcement law. 
 In addition, the Supreme Court decided four more ordinary immigration 
cases in the 2011 Term, a large number of immigration cases for it to 
decide on the merits in a single Term. Those decisions offer critically 
important insights into how the Court approaches the bread-and-butter of 
the federal courts’ immigration docket. Despite the fact that the 
immigration laws are tough on noncitizens convicted of criminal 
offenses,172 the Court approached the cases as standard exercises of 
statutory interpretation, administrative deference, and the application of 
other generally applicable doctrines. 
All five immigration decisions of the 2011 Term fall squarely into the 
mainstream of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Immigrants won three of 
the cases, which is not a bad win-loss percentage in light of the strict laws 
being applied and the deference generally afforded the government. 
A. Arizona v. United States: Federal Preemption of a State Immigration 
Enforcement Law 
With Congress failing to enact immigration reform, despite attempts 
spanning nearly a decade,173 a growing number of state legislatures passed 
laws purportedly designed to facilitate immigration enforcement.174 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which 
upheld Arizona’s business licensing law, arguably encouraged state and 
local governments to act in the name of immigration enforcement.175  
                                                                                                                 
 171. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012); see Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: 
Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 299 
(2013) (“Arizona v. United States was a watershed decision because it reaffirmed a model of 
federalism that accords deference to Congress in regulating immigration and in delegating 
broad rule-making authority to the Executive.”). 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77. 
 173. See, e.g., Kevin. R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2009). 
 174. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48. 
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In 2010, the Arizona legislature passed the Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, popularly known as SB 1070.176 
This new immigration enforcement measure was considerably broader in 
scope than the Arizona Legal Workers Act upheld by the Court in Whiting; 
SB 1070 generated substantial national controversy for its tough brand of 
state immigration enforcement.177  
SB 1070's “stated purpose is to ‘discourage and deter the unlawful entry 
and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present 
in the United States. . . . The law’s provisions establish an official state 
policy of ‘attrition through enforcement.”178 The court of appeals struck 
down four central provisions of the law.179  
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve important questions 
concerning the interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law 
of immigration and alien status.”180 Court watchers predicted that a 
conservative Court might well uphold much, if not all, of the Arizona law, 
which many conservatives championed.181  
                                                                                                                 
 176. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). For analysis of the myriad of legal 
issues raised by SB 1070, see Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010). 
 177. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in 
Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL. 367, 
368-69 (2013); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in Arizona, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & 
L. 168, passim (2012); Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and SB 1070: Demonization, 
Dehumanization, and Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35 (2011); David A. 
Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 
Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523 (2011); see also 
George A. Martínez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology of Whiteness, the 
Geography of Race, Interest Convergence, and the View from the Perspective of Critical 
Theory, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175 (2012) (analyzing adverse impacts on Latina/os, immigrants 
and citizens alike, of a series of laws enacted by the Arizona legislature, including SB 1070). 
 178. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). For a vigorous defense of the “attrition by enforcement” strategy, 
which sees increased removals as a path toward decreasing the overall size of the 
undocumented immigrant population in the United States, see Kris W. Kobach, Attrition 
Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 155 (2008). 
 179. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 180. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (citation omitted). 
 181. See Dan Nowicki, SB 1070 Supreme Court Ruling May Impact U.S. Races, ARIZ. 
CENT. (June 2, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/05/31/2012053 
1sb-1070-supreme-court-impact-races.html; Mike Sacks, SB 1070: Supreme Court Appears to 
Favor Arizona on Controversial Immigration Law, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 25, 2012, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
88 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:57 
 
 
In Arizona v. United States, the Court—in a majority opinion by Justice 
Kennedy joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor—largely agreed with the Ninth Circuit and invalidated three 
core provisions of SB 1070.182 A five-three Court found that federal 
immigration law preempted sections 3 (creating a state crime for failing to 
carry an alien registration document), 5(c) (making it a crime under state 
law to work without authorization), and 6 (authorizing the warrantless 
arrest of persons believed to have committed an offense making them 
removable from the United States).183 
A majority of the Court upheld one provision of SB 1070.184 Section 
2(B) of the law requires state and local law enforcement officers to verify 
the immigration status of persons who they reasonably suspect of being in 
the country in violation of the immigration laws.185 Refusing to invalidate 
the provision on its face, the Court left open the possibility of challenges to 
its application by Arizona law enforcement authorities in individual 
cases.186  
Not able to agree among themselves, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito 
all filed separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.187 Most 
jarring among the opinions was Justice Scalia’s, who would have upheld 
SB 1070 in its entirety.188 Exhibiting a strident ideological tone relatively 
rare in a Supreme Court opinion, his partial dissent noted at the outset that  
[t]he United States is an indivisible “Union of sovereign States.” 
Today’s opinion, approving virtually all of the Ninth Circuit’s 
injunction against enforcement of the four challenged provisions 
of Arizona’s law, deprives States of what most would consider 
the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude 
from the sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be 
                                                                                                                 
http://huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/25/sb-1070-supreme-court-arizona-immigration-law_n_145 
1622.html; Hannah Yi, Arizona Preps for SB 1070 Ruling, PBS, (June 15, 2012), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/arizona-preps-for-sb-1070-ruling/14067/.  
 182. See 132 S. Ct. at 2510-11. Justice Kagan did not participate in the consideration or 
decision in the case. See id. at 2511. 
 183. See id. at 2510. 
 184. See id. at 2507-10. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. at 2510. 
 187. See infra text accompanying notes 188-194. 
 188. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2511-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   
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there. Neither the Constitution itself nor even any law passed by 
Congress supports this result. . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude 
persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations 
expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by 
Congress.189 
Justice Scalia proceeded to express disapproval of, if not outright disdain 
for, the Obama administration’s immigration policy choices, including 
some that appeared to be only marginally related to the Arizona law before 
the Court.190 In conclusion, Justice Scalia sarcastically quipped that “[i]f 
securing its territory [through SB 1070] is not within the power of Arizona, 
we should cease referring to it as a sovereign State.”191 Attracting 
considerable media attention, his stinging rebuke of the majority opinion 
was more often than not criticized as excessive.192 
Although agreeing with Justice Scalia that federal law did not preempt 
any of SB 1070, Justice Thomas reached that conclusion through more 
conventional federal preemption analysis and without Justice Scalia’s 
strident criticism of the Obama administration’s immigration policy 
choices.193 Adhering to precedent, Justice Alito would have only found 
section 3, involving noncitizen registration, to be preempted by federal 
immigration law.194  
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 190. See id. at 2521 (criticizing the Obama administration’s 2012 Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program that temporarily deferred the removal of undocumented 
immigrants brought to the United States as children). 
 191. Id. at 2522. 
 192. See Dana Milbank, On Arizona Immigration Law, Justice Scalia and Street Protesters 
Make Same Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/on-
arizona-immigration-law-justice-scalia-and-street-protesters-make-same-case/2012/04/25/gIQ 
Ar6LmhT_story.html; Nathan Pippenger, Scalia Reveals How Little He Knows About 
Immigration Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/politics/102973/justices-supreme-court-conservative-immigration-laws; David G. 
Savage, Did Justice Antonin Scalia Go Too Far This Time?, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2012, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/27/nation/la-na-scalia-20120627.  
 193. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
 194. Id. at 2524 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Court previously 
had invalidated a similar provision in a Pennsylvania law. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 72 (1941).  
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As noted above, the Court’s upholding of section 2(B) of SB 1070 
generated considerable concern and criticism.195 Popularly known as the 
“show your papers” requirement, this provision, which can be found in 
many of the new immigration enforcement laws passed by the states,196 
mandates state and local police to verify the immigration status of anyone 
about whom they have a “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful presence in the 
United States.197 Critics worried that implementation of section 2(B) would 
result in increased racial profiling of Latina/os by state and local officers in 
criminal law enforcement.198 By focusing on the technical federal 
preemption challenge and reserving the possibility of future “as applied” 
challenges, the majority’s approach allowed the Court to sidestep the most 
frequently voiced civil rights concern with SB 1070.199  
The Court in Arizona v. United States, including all of the separate 
opinions (except perhaps Justice Scalia’s), applied generally applicable 
federal preemption doctrine in a relatively unremarkable way. That 
application resembled the analysis in which the Court has engaged in 
deciding whether federal law preempted state laws in other substantive 
areas,200 as well as its by-the-books decision the previous Term in Chamber 
of Commerce v. Whiting.201  
Although the Court made it clear that federal power preempted various 
enforcement efforts in Arizona v. United States and ensured federal primacy 
over immigration regulation,202 its decision the previous term in Whiting 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 630 (describing how § 2(B)’s requirement that state 
and local police verify the immigration status of persons whom they have a “reasonable 
suspicion” to believe are unlawfully in the United States is one of the most controversial 
features of SB 1070); see also Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The 
Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s SB 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 331-33 (2012) (analyzing claim that SB 
1070 would increase racial profiling by local law enforcement). 
 196. See Johnson, supra note 148, at 617. 
 197. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 198. See supra note 177. 
 199. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01. 
 200. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88 (2000) 
(holding that federal law preempted Massachusetts law that restricted the ability of state 
agencies to purchase goods or services from companies that did business with Burma 
(Myanmar)); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (ruling that 
the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act preempted state environmental regulation).  
 201. See supra Part II.A (discussing Whiting). 
 202. For analysis of recent developments in federal preemption of state and local 
immigration enforcement laws, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 
601 (2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & 
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made it equally clear that Congress ensured some room for the states to act 
in the realm of immigration enforcement.203 In striking down core 
provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 as intruding on the federal power to 
regulate immigration, the Supreme Court surprised many observers who 
predicted that the conservative Roberts Court would uphold the law in its 
entirety.204  
B. Judulang v. Holder: Relief from Removal 
Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, repealed in 
1996,205 provided for a “waiver of excludability” allowing a noncitizen to 
secure relief preventing removal from the country despite a criminal 
conviction.206 The Supreme Court in Judulang v. Holder addressed a 
question about the availability of that form of relief to a lawful permanent 
resident convicted of a crime.207  
The U.S. government sought to remove from the United States Joel 
Judulang, a lawful permanent resident from the Philippines who had lived 
in this country since 1974, based on a 1989 voluntary manslaughter 
conviction.208 The U.S. government argued that Judulang should be 
removed from the United States because he had committed an “aggravated 
felony” involving a “crime of violence.”209 The BIA ruled, and the Ninth 
                                                                                                                 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration 
Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 NYU L. REV. 2074 (2013); Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten 
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013); Kit Johnson & Peter J. Spiro, Debate: 
Immigration Preemption After United States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100 
(2012), available at http://scholarship. 
law.upenn.edu/cgl/viewcontent/cgi?article=1095&context=penn_law_review_online; Karla 
Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
333 (2013); Daniel J. Tichenor & Alexandra Filindra, Raising Arizona v. United States: 
Historical Patterns of American Immigration Federalism, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1215, 
passim (2012). 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. See supra note 181 (citing news reports to this effect). 
 205. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), repealed by Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597 (1952) (repealed 1996). 
 206. The Court had previously ruled that noncitizens could apply for § 212(c) relief 
based on criminal convictions before Congress repealed the statutory provision in 1996 
immigration reforms. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).  
 207. 132 S. Ct. 476, 479-82 (2011).  
 208. See id. at 477. 
 209. Id.  
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Circuit agreed, that a “crime of violence” was not “comparable” to any 
ground for exclusion for which a waiver of excludability was available and 
Judulang thus was not eligible for relief from removal under section 
212(c).210 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the 
question.211 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan flatly rejected the BIA’s 
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions: 
This case concerns the Board of Immigration Appeals’ . . . 
policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to the 
Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-
repealed provision of the immigration laws. We hold that the 
BIA’s approach is arbitrary and capricious.  
 The legal background of this case is complex, but the 
principle guiding our decision is anything but. When an 
administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned 
explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is an 
unwavering one. Here, the BIA has failed to meet it.212 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court applied mainstream administrative 
law principles borrowed from the Administrative Procedure Act213 and, far 
from rubber-stamping the agency ruling, found that the BIA’s ruling 
“flunked” minimal judicial review.214 The Court bluntly emphasized that 
“[w]e must reverse an agency policy when we cannot discern a reason for 
it. That is the trouble in this case.”215 The Court further noted that the BIA’s 
arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the statute failed to warrant 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See In re Judulang, A34 461 941-EL Centro, 2006 WL 557842, at *2 (B.I.A. Feb. 3, 
2006); Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 F. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded by 
132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
 211. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 & n.6 (citing lower court decisions in conflict on 
this question). 
 212. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
 213. See id. at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The Court looked to the Administrative 
Procedure Act even though it technically does not apply to removal proceedings. See 
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1955). 
 214. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484. 
 215. Id. at 490. Influential jurist Judge Richard Posner, well known for his law and 
economics approach to the law, has been similarly harsh in criticizing BIA rulings. See 
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1679-
87 (2007).  
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deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,216 the 
seminal administrative law decision articulating the standard applicable to 
the review of an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.217  
The Judulang Court applied the same basic principles of statutory 
interpretation to the immigration laws that it generally applies to the 
interpretation of other statutes.218 The Court’s unanimous opinion is nothing 
less than a stinging rebuke of the BIA’s reasoning and the U.S. 
government’s defense of it. In addition, the decision follows the trend of 
subjecting the immigration decisions of the BIA to the same general 
standards of judicial review that apply to actions of other administrative 
agencies.219  
C. Kawashima v. Holder: Removal for Tax Crimes  
In Kawashima v. Holder,220 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a six-three 
decision by Justice Thomas, affirmed a court of appeals holding that a tax 
crime was an aggravated felony under the U.S. immigration laws, which 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7 (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 217. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin 
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074 (1990). For provocative 
questioning of the meaningfulness of judicial review of administrative decisions under 
Chevron and other deference doctrines, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative 
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009).  
 218. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent 
Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 332 
(2012). See generally Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When 
Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 NYU ANN. SURV AM. L. 503 
(2013). 
 219. For analysis of Judulang v. Holder, see Adjoa Anim-Appiah, Raising the Standard: 
Judulang v. Holder Condemns the Use of Arbitrary and Capricious Policies When 
Determining Eligibility for the Section 212(c) Waiver, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 261 (2013); Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2012); Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits 
Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future 
Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (2012); see also Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are 
Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 367, 403-07 (2013) (viewing Court’s reliance on administrative law principles 
in Judulang as a way of avoiding the recognition of constitutional rights of immigrants). The 
BIA later implemented the Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder to ensure the appropriate 
availability of § 212(c) relief. See In re Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014). 
 220. 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1176 (2012).  
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would subject an immigrant to mandatory removal from the United States. 
Akio and Fusako Kawashima, lawful permanent residents from Japan who 
had lived in the United States since 1984, were convicted for the filing, and 
aiding and abetting in the filing, of a false statement on a corporate tax 
return. The immigration question was whether the crimes constituted 
aggravated felonies, thereby requiring removal.221 Engaging in a 
straightforward interpretation of the text of the statute, the Court agreed 
with the BIA and the court of appeals that the tax crimes at issue did in fact 
constitute aggravated felonies.222 
At times, the Supreme Court has applied the rule of lenity to interpret 
ambiguities in the removal provisions of the immigration laws in favor of 
the noncitizen resisting deportation.223 However, a majority of the Court in 
Kawashima found that there was no ambiguity in the statutory provision in 
question.224  
Joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg dissented.225 
Reading the statute as more ambiguous than the majority, she relied on the 
rule of lenity as justifying interpretation of the statute in favor of the 
noncitizens.226 Justice Ginsburg, therefore, concluded that the Kawashimas’ 
tax crimes failed to constitute aggravated felonies.227  
As often is the case in immigration cases, the majority and the dissent in 
Kawashima engaged in a debate over the proper construction of complex 
U.S. immigration laws. And, as is common in the Court’s decisions, the 
majority and dissent employed contrasting methods of statutory 
interpretation.228 The majority focused on the plain meaning of the statute; 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See id. at 1170. 
 222. See id. at 1176. 
 223. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); supra text accompanying notes 
93-95. 
 224. See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (“[T]he Kawashimas argue that [the 
statute] . . . is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the statute in their favor. It 
is true that we have, in the past, construed ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien’s 
favor. . . . We think the application of the present statute clear enough that resort to the rule 
of lenity is not warranted.”) (emphasis added)). 
 225. Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 226. See id. at 1177-80. 
 227. See id. at 1181. 
 228. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 
(2004). For commentary on the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence, see 
generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent read the statutory text and its structure 
differently.229 In interpreting the relevant provisions of the immigration 
law, all of the Justices looked to a generally-applicable legal principle—the 
rule of lenity—but reached different conclusions about whether it 
applied.230 
D. Vartelas v. Holder: Retroactive Application of Immigration Reforms  
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) added Immigration and Nationality Act section 
101(a)(13)(C)(v),231 which changed the definition of “admission” into the 
United States. That new provision deems a lawful permanent resident 
returning from a brief trip outside the country who had been convicted of 
certain criminal offenses to be seeking initial admission into the country; 
that noncitizen thus is subject to all of the inadmissibility provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.232 
Panagis Vartelas originally came lawfully to the United States in 1979 
on a student visa and later became a lawful permanent resident.233 In 1994, 
he pleaded guilty to a felony of conspiring to make a counterfeit security 
and subsequently served a four-month sentence.234 Relying on the 1996 
amendment, the U.S. government denied admission to Vartelas upon his 
return to the United States after a brief visit to Greece in 2003, because the 
previous counterfeiting conviction was a “crime involving moral 
turpitude.”235  
Before 1996, a lawful permanent resident in Vartelas’s situation would 
have been able to take a short trip out of the country without risking denial 
of re-entry.236 Even after 1996, Vartelas would not have been subject to 
                                                                                                                 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 225-27. 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 220-27. 
 231. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 232. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
 233. See Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483, 1485 (2012). 
 234. See id. at 1483. 
 235. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 236. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (holding that an “innocent, casual and 
brief” trip outside the United States by a lawful permanent resident was not a departure 
warranting the treatment of the return to the country as a new “entry” subject to the full array 
of exclusion grounds). 
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removal if he had not traveled outside the United States.237 However, as the 
U.S. government interpreted the 1996 provision, Vartelas could be denied 
admission back into the country because of a brief trip outside the United 
States.238 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the 
circuits on the question.239 In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg for a six-three 
majority, the Court rejected the BIA’s order that Vartelas be returned to 
Greece: 
We conclude that the relevant provision of IIRIRA, § 
1101(a)(13)(C)(v), attached a new disability (denial of reentry) 
in respect to past events (Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA offense, plea, and 
conviction). Guided by the deeply rooted presumption against 
retroactive legislation, we hold that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does 
not apply to Vartelas’ conviction.240  
To reach that conclusion, the Court applied the general “presumption 
against retroactive legislation” and the retroactivity doctrine articulated in 
its 1994 decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.241 The Court held that, 
in pleading guilty to the criminal charge in 1994, Vartelas “likely relied”242 
on the law as it existed at that time, which allowed him to take brief trips 
outside the United States without risking denial of re-entry into the 
country.243 
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia dissented.244 The 
dissent viewed the activity regulated by the 1996 amendment to the 
immigration laws as Vartelas’ reentry into the United States after a trip 
outside the country after 1996, rather than the decision to plead guilty to a 
criminal offense before 1996.245 Consequently, the BIA, in Justice Scalia’s 
estimation, did not retroactively apply the new statutory language of the 
1996 act; the test for whether retroactive application of the law was 
constitutional therefore should not apply.246 Vartelas’s readmission to the 
United States involved a trip in 2003 that occurred years after the effective 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 238. See id. at 1483-84. 
 239. Id. at 1486 (citing cases). 
 240. Id. at 1483-84.  
 241. 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). 
 242. Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1491. 
 243. See id. at 1483-84. 
 244. See id. at 1492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 245. See id. at 1493. 
 246. Id. at 1493-94. 
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date of the legislation.247 Justice Scalia chastised the majority for evading 
the plain meaning of the statute to achieve what it deemed to be the fair 
result in the case.248 
In sum, the Supreme Court found for Vartelas in an opinion that, relying 
on the generally applicable test for the retroactive application of new laws, 
concluded that the application of the 1996 amendments to Vartelas’ case 
would be unconstitutional.249 The majority and the dissent differed 
primarily with respect to the application of standard retroactivity doctrine to 
Vartelas’s brief trip to Greece. A majority ruled that he could not be 
constitutionally subject to retroactive application of the 1996 
amendment.250 
E. Holder v. Gutierrez: Eligibility for Relief from Removal  
In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court reviewed the BIA’s ruling that 
the years of a parent’s residency in the United States could not be imputed 
to a minor child for purposes of calculating the years of residence necessary 
for eligibility for relief from removal known as “cancellation of 
removal.”251 A split in the circuits had developed on this question of 
statutory construction.252  
In 1989, the family of five-year-old Carlos Martinez Gutierrez brought 
him unlawfully from Mexico to the United States.253 Two years later, 
Martinez Gutierrez’s father was admitted to the country as a lawful 
permanent resident.254 More than a decade later, in 2003, the U.S. 
government granted Martinez Gutierrez lawful immigration status. He was 
later apprehended for smuggling undocumented immigrants across the 
U.S.-Mexico border.255 To defend against removal from the United States, 
Martinez Gutierrez sought cancellation of removal.256 The immigration 
court concluded that, even though Martinez Gutierrez himself did not 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Id. at 1496. 
 248. See id. at 1495. 
 249. For application of Vartelas, see United States v. Gill, 748 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 250. Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1491-92.  
 251. Holder v. Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2020-21 (2012); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b 
(requiring, among other things, continuing presence in the United States of seven years for 
lawful permanent residents, and ten years for undocumented immigrants and other 
noncitizens, to be eligible for cancellation of removal). 
 252. See Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2016 (citing conflicting court of appeals’ decisions). 
 253. Id. at 2016-17. 
 254. See id. at 2016. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id.  
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satisfy the statutory requirement of seven years of continuous residence in 
the United States, he qualified for this relief based on his father’s 
residency.257 The BIA reversed.258 The court of appeals granted Martinez 
Gutierrez’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for 
reconsideration.259 
A companion case had similar facts. In 1995, fifteen-year-old Damien 
Sawyers was admitted as a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica.260 At 
that time, his mother had lawfully entered the country and resided in the 
country for six years.261 In 2002, Sawyers was convicted of a drug offense, 
and the U.S. government initiated proceedings to remove him from the 
country.262 The immigration court found Sawyers to be ineligible for 
cancellation of removal because he was a few months short of the seven 
years of continuous residence required by the statute and refused to impute 
his mother’s years of residency to him.263 The BIA denied the petition for 
review, but the court of appeals disagreed.264 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan deferred to the BIA’s 
construction of the statutory provision in question.265 The Court concluded 
that the Board’s refusal to impute of the time of parent’s residence to the 
child for purposes of eligibility for relief from removal was a reasonable 
construction of the ambiguous statutory provision in question.266 
Accordingly, the Court found that the agency’s interpretation was entitled 
to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.267  
The Court’s decision in Holder v. Gutierrez has all the trappings of the 
run-of-the-mill Chevron deference case.268 That it was a unanimous 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 2017. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id.  
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 2014-15. 
 266. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). For criticism of the Court’s decision, see Johanna K.P. 
Dennis, “Mommy, Where Is Home?”: Imputing Parental Immigration Status and Residency 
for Undocumented Immigrant Children, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 991 (2012). 
 267. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For analysis of the Supreme Court’s application of Chevron 
deference to immigration cases, see supra note 218 (citing authorities). 
 268. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Christensen v. Harris County, 
529 U.S. 576 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  
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decision, with the opinion assigned to the most junior Justice, suggests that 
the Court did not find the decision to be particularly controversial. The 
Court merely addressed an ordinary immigration case in a routine fashion. 
IV. The 2012 Term 
In the 2012 Term, the Supreme Court handed down two merits decisions 
in immigration cases. In one significant case, the Court rejected the 
mandatory removal of a long-term lawful permanent resident based on a 
single criminal conviction involving possession of a small amount of 
marijuana.269 The Court in another case applied generally applicable legal 
doctrine in refusing to retroactively apply its decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, which expanded the right to effective assistance of counsel to 
include appraisal of the possible immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction under a plea agreement.270 
The Court in the 2012 Term also denied certiorari and declined to review 
a court of appeals decision striking down much of Alabama’s controversial 
immigration enforcement law, which represented a brand of immigration 
enforcement even stricter, in certain respects, than Arizona’s.271 
A. Moncrieffe v. Holder: Removal for Marijuana Possession 
Adrian Moncrieffe was lawfully brought to the United States from 
Jamaica in 1984 at age three.272 He had two U.S. citizen children.273 In 
2007, local police stopped Moncrieffe while he was driving his automobile 
on the interstate in Georgia, en route to Miami, Florida, after a short visit 
with his daughter in Atlanta.274 Police found 1.3 grams of marijuana (about 
two or three cigarettes) in the vehicle.275 Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to 
                                                                                                                 
 269. See infra Part IV.A. 
 270. See infra Part IV.B. 
 271. See infra Part IV.C. 
 272. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013). 
 273. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (No. 11-
702) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_ 
preview/briefs/11-702_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 274. See id. at 5. For a detailed analysis of the facts upon which about the stop and arrest 
culminating in Moncrieffe’s criminal conviction, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in 
the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967 (2015). 
 275. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683. Possession of a small amount of marijuana for 
personal use would not violate current law in several states. See Brandy Zadrozny, From Dry to 
High: Your Guide to State Pot Laws, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:45 AM ET), http:// www. the 
dailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/29/from-dry-to-high-your-guide-to-state-pot-laws.html (reporting 
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violating a Georgia law criminalizing a broad range of conduct, from the 
possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use to distribution 
of large quantities for sale.276 He successfully completed probation.277 The 
marijuana conviction was Moncrieffe’s one and only criminal conviction in 
his decades of lawful residence in the United States.278 
Two years later, U.S. immigration officials arrested, detained, and 
initiated removal proceedings against Moncrieffe, claiming that the 
marijuana conviction constituted an aggravated felony under the 
immigrations laws.279 The immigration court ordered Moncrieffe removed 
from the United States.280 The BIA affirmed and the Fifth Circuit, in an 
opinion by Judge Edith Jones, denied the petition for review of the removal 
order.281 
In a seven-two decision,282 the Supreme Court resolved a split among the 
circuits283 concerning whether a conviction under a state statute that 
criminalizes conduct characterized by both the Controlled Substance Act’s 
felony and misdemeanor provisions constitutes an aggravated felony under 
the immigration laws, thus rendering the noncitizen ineligible for 
cancellation of removal.284 Following the “categorical approach” to the 
classification of state criminal offenses as aggravated felonies for purposes 
of removal under federal law,285 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, held that the conviction under Georgia law criminalizing 
possession of a small amount of marijuana (as was the case for Moncrieffe) 
                                                                                                                 
that sixteen states have decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal 
use).  
 276. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685-87. 
 277. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 273, at 5-6. 
 278. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683-84. 
 279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 280. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683.  
 281. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 389, 392-93 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d and 
remanded by 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).  
 282. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1678. 
 283. See id. at 1684 n.3 (noting conflicting court of appeals decisions). 
 284. Id. at 1684.  
 285. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting 
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer Lee 
Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining 
the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2012); Laura Jean 
Eichten, Comment, A Felony, I Presume? 21 USC § 841(b)’s Mitigating Provision and the 
Categorical Approach in Immigration Proceedings, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093 (2012). The 
Court also followed the categorical approach in an analogous setting in another case in the 
2012 Term, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).  
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as well as actual distribution of controlled substances,286 failed to constitute 
an aggravated felony 
In Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court for the second time in the last five 
Terms rejected the U.S. government’s assertion that a minor drug offense 
constituted an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.287 Those 
decisions together demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to subject long-term 
lawful permanent residents of the United States to the equival of mandatory 
removal based on relatively small-time drug convictions. In both instances, 
the Court exercised ordinary review of the administrative agency decision 
and rejected the agency’s interpretation of the immigration laws. 
B. Chaidez v. United States: Retroactive Application of Padilla v. Kentucky 
Chaidez v. United States288 involved the relatively commonplace 
question of the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision. A 
native of Mexico, Roselva Chaidez entered the United States in 1971 and 
became a lawful permanent resident in 1977.289 About twenty years later, 
she was involved in an automobile insurance fraud scheme in which she 
received less than two thousand dollars: on advice of counsel, Chaidez 
pleaded guilty to mail fraud and received a sentence of probation and 
restitution.290 
In 2009, Chaidez filed a naturalization petition.291 That filing brought her 
criminal conviction to the attention of the U.S. government, which 
instituted removal proceedings against her.292 Seeking to avoid removal 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1686-87. In one case, the Court granted certiorari, 
vacated a court of appeals ruling, and remanded for further consideration in light of the 
decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. See Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2019 (2013). For courts applying Moncrieffe’s categorical 
approach, see, for example, Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 61-62 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 754 F.3d 
1105 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded on other grounds by 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). The BIA offered direction in 
applying Moncrieffe’s categorical approach in In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349 
(BIA 2014). 
 287. See supra Part I.B (analyzing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder). Importantly, the U.S. 
government still has the discretion to seek to remove Moncrieffe from the United States 
based on the marijuana offense. See Victor C. Romero, A Meditation on Moncrieffe: On 
Marijuana, Misdemeanants, and Migration, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 32 (2014). 
 288. 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013). 
 289. Id. at 1105. 
 290. Id. at 1105-06. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Id.  
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after living in the country for more than thirty-five years, Chaidez brought 
an action to set aside the conviction, claiming that her attorney never 
warned her that the plea bargain and conviction might result in her removal 
from the United States.293 While that action was pending, the Supreme 
Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires attorneys in criminal cases to inform noncitizen defendants of the 
possible immigration consequences of guilty pleas.294  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, because her 
criminal conviction had become final before the Court decided Padilla v. 
Kentucky, Chaidez was not entitled to the benefit of that ruling.295 The 
Supreme Court “granted certiorari . . . to resolve a split among federal and 
state courts on whether Padilla applies retroactively.”296  
Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court refused to afford 
Chaidez the retroactive benefit of Padilla v. Kentucky.297 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kagan applied generally applicable retroactivity 
principles, including the Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane,298 and 
concluded that the Padilla decision did not apply to cases already final 
when it was decided.299 The Court reasoned that the change in the law was 
sufficiently “new” that it should not apply retroactively.300 
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reiterating the view that the 
Court had incorrectly decided Padilla.301  
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.302 Because in 
her view Padilla did not announce a “new” rule, Justice Sotomayor would 
have retroactively applied the decision.303  
Chaidez is best understood as a run-of-the mill application of basic 
retroactivity doctrine.304 The assignment of the junior Justice to write for 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Id. at 1106. 
 294. See supra Part I.A. 
 295. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 296. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 n.2 (footnote citing cases). 
 297. See id. 
 298. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 299. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107-11. 
 300. See id. 
 301. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); supra text 
accompanying notes 63-64 (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent, which Justice Thomas 
joined, in Padilla v. Kentucky). 
 302. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114-21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 303. See id. at 1114. 
 304. See Austen Ishii, Note, There and Back, Now and Then:  IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and 
the Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949 (2014) 
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the majority suggests that the case was relatively uncontroversial and that 
the Court did not see itself as breaking new ground. The majority and 
dissent both focused on the proper application of existing retroactivity 
precedent (Teague v. Lane) to the case before the Court.305 
The holding in Chaidez v. United States that Padilla does not apply 
retroactively will affect plea bargains in which convictions were entered 
before the Supreme Court decided Padilla. Commentators have criticized 
the Chaidez decision.306 Because the Obama administration has made it a 
priority to remove immigrants convicted of crimes from the United States 
by instituting removal actions based on relatively stale criminal 
convictions,307 Chaidez is likely to affect thousands of lawful permanent 
residents facing removal who will potentially suffer separation from family, 
friends, employment, and community, if removed from the United States.308 
Having lived in the United States for decades, Chaidez herself has three 
children and two grandchildren, all U.S. citizens.309 Now facing removal 
based on a minor criminal conviction that under current law was secured in 
violation of the Constitution, she faces the possibility of being torn away 
                                                                                                                 
(contending that courts had taken an unexceptional approach to questions of retroactive 
application of 1996 immigration legislation).  
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 297-303. 
 306. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless & Andrew Stanton, Teague New Rules Must Apply in 
Initial-Review Collateral Proceedings: The Teachings of Padilla, Chaidez and Martinez, 67 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2013); Jennifer H. Berman, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: 
Overcoming Teague’s “Watershed” Exception to Non-Retroactivity, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
667 (2012); Petra Bondra, Note, Chaidez v. United States Erringly Resolves Non-
Retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 387 (2013); Tara M. Breslawski, 
Note, “But My Attorney Didn’t Tell Me I’d Be Deported!” – The Retroactivity of Padilla, 29 
TOURO L. REV. 1487 (2013); Allison C. Callaghan, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: A Case 
for Retroactivity, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2012); Levi Price, Comment, Chaidez v. 
United States: Breaking Old Ground, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 533 (2014). 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77 
 308. Commentators have criticized the large number of removals of immigrants that 
separate families, including families with U.S. citizen children. See Shani M. King, U.S. 
Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward A Functional 
Definition of Family That Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509 (2010); David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward 
a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58 (2006); Marie 
Weisenberger, Comment, Broken Families: A Call for Consideration of the Family of Illegal 
Immigrants in U.S. Immigration Enforcement Efforts, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 495 (2011). 
 309. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (No. 
11-820), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_ 
court_preview/briefs/11-820_pet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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from U.S. citizen family members and the only community she really 
knows. 
C. Alabama v. United States: Certiorari Denial in a Federal Preemption 
Case 
Building on Arizona’s SB 1070,310 the Alabama legislature in 2011 
passed the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act.311 In certain respects, the Alabama law was stricter than Arizona’s SB 
1070.312 It, for example, would have required the Alabama public schools to 
collect data on the number of enrolled undocumented students.313 This was 
an apparent step toward collecting the information necessary to mount a 
legal challenge to the Supreme Court’s holding in Plyler v. Doe, which 
invalidated a Texas law effectively barring undocumented students from the 
public schools.314  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that federal 
immigration law preempted large portions of Alabama’s immigration 
enforcement law.315 The Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia dissenting 
(consistent with his scathing dissent in Arizona v. United States),316 denied 
certiorari in Alabama v. United States. In doing so, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 310. See supra Part III.A (analyzing Arizona v. United States). 
 311. ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-35 (2011).  
 312. See William Arrocha, From Arizona’s S.B. 1070 to Georgia’s H.B. 87 and 
Alabama’s H.B. 56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and Practices 
of Segregation, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 245 (2012); Maria Pabón López et al., The Prospects 
and Challenges of Educational Reform for Latino Undocumented Children: An Essay 
Examining Alabama’s H.B. 56 and Other State Immigration Measures, 6 FIU L. REV. 231 
(2011); Elizabeth M. Rieser-Murphy & Kathryn D. DeMarco, The Unintended 
Consequences of Alabama’s Immigration Law on Domestic Violence Victims, 66 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1059 (2012). 
 313. ALA. CODE § 31-13-27 (2011), invalidated by United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 
1269 (11th Cir. 2012).  
 314. 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982) (stating that the record in the case failed to support the 
claim of the state of Texas that undocumented immigrants burden the state’s economy and 
that their exclusion from the public schools would improve the overall quality of education); 
see also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the 
Same As the “Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 392-96 (2012) 
(explaining the adverse impacts of the Alabama immigration enforcement law on access to 
education of immigrants and Latina/os generally); Kevin R. Johnson, Sweet Home Alabama?  
Immigration and Civil Rights in the “New” South, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 22 (2011) (to 
the same effect).  
 315. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2022 (2013). 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92. 
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declined to re-enter the fray of state immigration enforcement laws after 
Arizona v. United States.317 It instead followed the conventional practice of 
allowing the Court’s recent decision on similar issues to percolate through 
the lower courts. The Court’s approach shows an unwillingness to reach to 
review a high profile case.  
V. The 2013 Term 
The 2013 Term was even slower than the previous Term with respect to 
immigration merit decisions. Focusing on the text of the relevant statute and 
the propriety of administrative deference, the Supreme Court’s single 
immigration merits decision exemplifies the Roberts Court’s unexceptional 
approach to immigration cases.318 
In the 2013 Term, the Court also denied certiorari in four cases, all but 
one of which struck down the guts of a state or local immigration 
enforcement law.319 Since deciding Arizona v. United States,320 the Court 
for the time being has opted not to review any more cases that raise the 
question of federal preemption of state and local immigration enforcement 
laws. 
A. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio: Visas for “Aged-out” Adult Children 
Due in no small part to limits in the U.S. immigration laws known as the 
per-country ceilings, which generally cap the number of visas that can issue 
annually to citizens from any particular country, many noncitizens face 
lengthy waits after filing visa applications before the U.S. government 
actually issues the visas.321 The delays can be years and, in some instances, 
decades for prospective immigrants and their families from nations that 
annually send large numbers of immigrants to the United States, such as 
Mexico, the Philippines, and India.322  
                                                                                                                 
 317. Alabama, 133 S. Ct. 2022.  
 318. See infra Part V.A. 
 319. See infra Part V.B. 
 320. See supra Part III.A. 
 321. See infra note 322 (citing authorities). 
 322. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law 
and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2009) (contending that the long delays 
in lawful immigration disparately impact nationals of developing nations largely populated 
by people of color); Bernard Trujillo, Immigrant Visa Distribution: The Case of Mexico, 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 713 (analyzing impacts of long lines for immigrant visas on prospective 
immigrants from Mexico). The current visa backlogs are a problem that various 
comprehensive immigration reform proposals promised to address, with some granting 
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In 2002, Congress passed the Child Status Protection Act.323 It amended 
the Immigration and Nationality Act to establish rules for determining 
answers to important practical questions caused by of the lengthy delays in 
the issuance of visas to noncitizens who initially qualified for visas as 
“children” but, due to the passage of time, “age out”—meaning that they 
would no longer qualify as children for immigrant visas under the 
immigration laws and would, therefore, no longer be eligible as derivative 
beneficiaries of their parents’ visa applications.  
Natives of El Salvador, Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio and her family 
waited seven years for immigrant visas that would allow them to rejoin 
Rosalina’s U.S. citizen mother in the United States.324 The government 
notified the family that they were next in line for visas, but they were also 
informed that the applicant’s son, who had turned twenty-one while the visa 
application was pending and was thus no longer a “child” for purposes of 
the immigration laws, was not eligible for a visa.325 He therefore could not 
lawfully immigrate to the United States with his mother. 
In an action challenging the interpretation of the statute by the BIA that 
resulted in the denial of a visa to Cuellar de Osorio’s son, the district court 
granted summary judgment for the U.S. government.326 An en banc panel of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
statute unambiguously grants relief to aged-out derivative beneficiaries; the 
court consequently found that, because the BIA’s interpretation conflicts 
with the plain language of the statute, it was not entitled to deference.327 
The dissent disagreed and found that the statute “is ambiguous about 
whether aged-out . . . derivative beneficiaries are within its ambit,” and, 
because the BIA’s conclusion is reasonable, is entitled to deference.328 
Under the U.S. government’s interpretation of the immigration statute, a 
noncitizen family member who “ages out” due to years of waiting for a visa 
faces a situation in which the longer the child waits in line, the more likely 
she will be removed from the line. Aged out adult children basically must 
apply for a visa anew and move to the back of the immigration line. The 
                                                                                                                 
sufficient numbers of visas to eliminate the backlog of applications. See Julia Preston, Goal 
Set for Reducing Backlog on Citizenship Applications, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A13.  
 323. Pub. L. No 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002). 
 324. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d and 
remanded by Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). The visa sought is 
known as a “F3” visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (2006). 
 325. Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. 
 326. Zhang v. Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 327. Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1013-14.  
 328. Id. at 1021 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
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U.S. government’s position denied families with aged out children the 
ability to lawfully immigrate together, an outcome that runs counter to a 
fundamental purpose of the U.S. immigration laws—to promote family 
reunification.329  
The Supreme Court decided to resolve a circuit split on the question.330 
A bipartisan group of members of Congress, including two prominent 
Republicans, Senators Orrin Hatch and John McCain, who voted for the 
2002 Child Status Protection Act, submitted an amici curiae brief in support 
of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute.331 
The specific question presented by Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio was 
whether all noncitizens who qualify as a “child” at the time a visa petition is 
filed but “age out” by the time the visa becomes available should receive a 
visa at the same time as the visa applicant.332 As amended by the Child 
Status Protection Act, Immigration and Nationality Act section 203(h) 
provides that  
[i]f the age of an alien is determined . . . to be 21 years of age or 
older . . . , the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to 
the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original 
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.333  
The BIA had interpreted that language to preclude the issuance of the visa 
to “aged out” children.334 
                                                                                                                 
 329. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 7, at 262; Donald Kerwin, How Our 
Immigration Laws Divide, Impoverish, and Undermine American Families, 76 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1213, 1214 (1999); see also Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: 
Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643 
(2014) (analyzing the intersection of immigration law and family law in the termination of 
parental rights of immigrant parents). 
 330. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2202, 2227 n.9 (2014) (citing 
cases). Compare Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2011) (disagreeing with the Ninth 
Circuit), with Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the Ninth 
Circuit), abrogated by Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191. 
 331. See Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Mayorkas v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (No. 12-930), available 
at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/12-930-bsac-Current-and-For 
mer-Members-of-Congress.pdf. 
 332. See Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2196-97. 
 333. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006).  
 334. See In re Xiuyi Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 32 (BIA 2009). For analysis of the issues 
in the case, see Dianne Milner, Note, No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth 
Circuit’s Interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act in De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 46 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 683 (2013). 
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Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Kagan wrote for the 
plurality, in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg.335 She 
began the analysis in telling fashion: 
Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets 
the immigration laws. Indeed, “judicial deference to the 
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration 
context,” where decisions about a complex statutory scheme 
often implicate foreign relations.336 
After analyzing the statutory text—replete with jocular references to its 
complexities,337 Justice Kagan concluded that it was ambiguous and subject 
to “internal tension mak[ing] possible alternative reasonable 
constructions . . . .”338 She ultimately concluded that “[t]his is the kind of 
case Chevron was built for. . . . Were we to overturn the Board in that 
circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert 
agency’s role. We decline that path, and defer to the Board.”339 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, unlike the plurality, 
found no conflict or internal tension in the statutory provision.340 In the 
Chief’s estimation, the BIA’s interpretation was consistent with the plain 
meaning of the statute.341 
Finding the BIA’s interpretation contrary to the statutory text and thus 
not entitled to deference, Justice Alito dissented.342 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Thomas (except as to 
one footnote), also dissented “[b]ecause the Court and the BIA ignore 
obvious ways in which [the statutory provision] can operate as a coherent 
whole and instead choose to construe the statute as a self-contradiction that 
was broken from the moment Congress wrote it.”343 
The decision in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio is the most recent 
example of the Court’s unexceptional approach to immigration law. The 
Court once again reviewed in conventional fashion a case squarely raising 
                                                                                                                 
 335. See Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2195. 
 336. Id. at 2203 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). This last 
sentence sounds of the plenary power doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11. 
 337. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203 (“Those hardy readers who have 
made it this far will surely agree with the ‘complexity’ [of the statutory scheme] point.”). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 2213. 
 340. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 341. See id. at 2215. 
 342. Id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 343. Id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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the question of the appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
immigration statute.344 The Court’s decision highlights the bread-and-butter 
immigration cases that the federal courts are reviewing today, with the 
primary issue being whether to accept the BIA’s interpretation of the 
statute. Although reasonable minds may differ about the propriety of the 
outcomes of the cases, the Roberts Court is consistently applying generally 
applicable legal doctrines to immigration law. 
B. Certiorari Denials in Federal Preemption Cases 
In the 2013 Term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in four cases in 
which the court of appeals addressed the question whether federal 
immigration law preempted state and local immigration enforcement laws. 
In so doing, the Court more or less followed its standard practice of 
declining to review cases that raised legal issues similar to those that it had 
recently decided. In three of the four cases, the lower courts had invalidated 
the core of the non-federal immigration enforcement laws.  
1. City of Hazleton v. Lozano 
In 2011, the Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded a Third 
Circuit decision invalidating an aggressive Hazleton, Pennsylvania 
immigration enforcement ordinance in light of its federal preemption 
decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.345 On remand, the court of 
appeals again concluded that federal immigration law preempted the 
Hazleton ordinance that, among other things, prohibited the rental of 
housing to, and barred the employment of, undocumented immigrants.346 
Denying certiorari, the Supreme Court declined to return to the thicket of 
nonfederal efforts to enforce the U.S. immigration laws.347 
2. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch  
Over a number of years, Farmers Branch, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, had 
enacted several iterations of an immigration enforcement ordinance that had 
generated considerable controversy.348 A sharply divided en banc court of 
                                                                                                                 
 344. See supra Part III.E (analyzing Holder v. Gutierrez). 
 345. See supra Part II.C.1.  
 346. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 347. City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
 348. See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local Immigration 
Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 504 (2010) (noting that the 
Farmers Branch city council had amended its ordinance on three occasions); Rose Cuison 
Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2013) (mentioning that the 
Farmers Branch ordinance prohibited housing rentals to undocumented immigrants); Daniel 
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appeals invalidated the ordinance.349 Noted conservative jurist Judge Edith 
Jones dissented; she would have found the ordinance a valid exercise of the 
“police power” and, thus, not preempted by federal immigration law.350 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, thereby declining to review the 
Fifth Circuit decision invalidating much of the Farmers Branch 
ordinance.351  
3. Arizona v. Valle del Sol, Inc. 
In a piece of litigation involving provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 law 
not at issue in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision,352 the Ninth Circuit in 
Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting held that federal immigration law preempted 
SB 1070’s effort to criminalize the harboring and transporting of 
undocumented immigrants.353 The Supreme Court declined to review the 
case.354  
4. Keller v. City of Fremont 
In Keller v. City of Fremont, the Eighth Circuit rejected a federal 
preemption challenge to much of a Fremont, Nebraska immigration 
enforcement ordinance similar to the Hazelton, Pennsylvania law.355 Passed 
in 2010, the ordinance, among other things provides that landlords are 
prohibited from renting housing to undocumented immigrants.356 Even 
though the court of appeals reached a different federal preemption 
conclusion than the other three courts did in cases in which the Court 
denied certiorari in the 2013 Term, the Court declined to review the case.357 
                                                                                                                 
Eduardo Guzman, Note, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances 
and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 409-12 (2010) (same); see 
also Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal 
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2009) 
(analyzing potential violations of federal law due to discriminatory aspects of local 
immigration ordinances restricting the rental of housing to undocumented immigrants).  
 349. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 350. See id. at 561-62 (Jones, J., dissenting).  
 351. City of Farmers v. Villas at Parkside Partners, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
 352. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United 
States involving challenges to other sections of SB 1070). 
 353. 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 354. Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014). 
 355. 719 F.3d 931, 951 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014). 
 356. See id. at 938-39. 
 357. See supra Parts V.B. 
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* * * * 
Since the Supreme Court in 2012 struck down much of Arizona’s SB 
1070 in Arizona v. United States,358 it has refused to review a series of cases 
raising the issue of federal preemption of state and local immigration 
enforcement laws. For the time being, the Court appears to have said its 
piece on the subject. 
VI. The Roberts Court and the Erosion of Immigration Exceptionalism  
A review of the Supreme Court decisions from the 2009 to the 2013 
Terms reveals that the Roberts Court has consistently applied conventional 
methods of statutory interpretation and doctrines of administrative 
deference in its immigration decisions. Its 2014 immigration decision in 
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio359 is a clear example, with the Justices 
interpreting the immigration statute differently and reaching contrasting 
conclusions about the propriety of deference to the agency interpretation of 
the statutory provision in question.360 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States also 
exemplifies immigration unexceptionalism.361 In an opinion generally 
lacking ideological flair, the Court invalidated in large part a controversial 
state immigration enforcement law that had grabbed national attention and 
provoked considerable debate.362 Indeed, in somewhat surprisingly striking 
down the core of SB 1070, the Court applied standard federal preemption 
principles in generally unremarkable fashion. 
Immigration law thus appears to be moving away from anything akin to 
the immigration exceptionalism for which it is well known363 and is 
becoming more consistent with other bodies of American jurisprudence. 
Although exceptions may arise in the future in the extraordinary case, 
immigration law in important respects has become what might be 
characterized as “mainstreamed” in American jurisprudence. 
A. The Mainstreaming of Immigration Law 
In its recent immigration jurisprudence, the Roberts Court consistently 
has applied generally applicable principles of statutory interpretation, rules 
of deference to administrative agencies, and other legal doctrines, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 358. See supra Part III.A. 
 359. See supra Part V.A. 
 360. See id.  
 361. See supra Part III.A. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11. 
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those involving retroactive application of changes in the law and federal 
preemption. By so doing, the Court has tended toward doctrinal consistency 
across substantive areas of the law.  
The U.S. government continues to make aggressive arguments for the 
affirmance of BIA removal orders, only to have the Court frequently reject 
them.364 The Court, for example, found unpersuasive the U.S. government’s 
attempts to subject long-term lawful permanent residents to mandatory 
deportation for what can be reasonably characterized as minor criminal 
offenses.365 Similarly, the Court refused to accept arbitrary and capricious 
limits imposed by the Board on relief from removal for long-term lawful 
permanent residents.366 Put simply, the executive branch has invoked 
zealous litigation positions to defend its aggressive removal efforts, only to 
have a conservative Supreme Court, which one might assume to be 
sympathetic, reject those arguments.  
Once in the five Terms, a deadlocked Court could not reach a decision in 
a case involving a challenge to gender distinctions in the nationality laws 
that squarely implicated the continuing vitality of the plenary power 
doctrine.367 The four-four split of the Justices suggests a divide over the 
constitutionality of the gender distinctions in the immigration laws. That 
division, in turn, suggests that the Court might in the future revisit the 
continuing vitality of the plenary power doctrine. 368  
In keeping with its generally unexceptional approach to immigration, the 
Roberts Court also has adhered to its standard guidelines for selecting 
                                                                                                                 
 364. See, e.g., infra note 365 (citing authorities). 
 365. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013); Vartelas v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 1479, 1483 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-81 
(2010); see also supra Parts I.B, III.D, and IV.A (analyzing these decisions).  Similarly, in 
the 2015 Term, the Court rejected a removal order based on a drug paraphernalia conviction 
for possession of a sock used to conceal four tablets of a prescription drug.  See Mellouli v. 
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 366. See, e.g., Part III.B (analyzing Judulang v. Holder and the Court’s rejection of a 
BIA ruling that it found to be arbitrary and capricious). 
 367. See supra Part II.B (discussing Flores-Villar v. United States). 
 368. Similiarly, a splintered Court in 2015 did not invoke the doctrine of consular 
nonreviewablity, a close cousin of the plenary power doctrine, in reviewing the denial of a 
visa application by a noncitizen spouse of a U.S. citizen. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 
(2015). The Court previously rejected claims pressed by the U.S. government that judicial 
review of the legal challenges of detainees in the “war on terror” were not subject to judicial 
review. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796-98 (2008) (holding that detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay had the constitutional right to habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 633-35 (2006) (finding that military tribunals for Guantánamo detainees violated 
the Geneva Convention). 
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which immigration decisions to accept for review. The Court has not 
stretched the rules to grant certiorari in controversial immigration cases, 
such as the California Supreme Court decision allowing undocumented 
immigrants to pay in-state fees at public universities or any of the numerous 
court of appeals decisions involving the constitutionality of state and local 
immigration enforcement laws.369 This caution reflects the work of a Court 
carefully adhering to its ordinary rules in selecting the immigration cases to 
review. 
All told, the Supreme Court has applied generally applicable legal 
principles to the immigration cases that it decides to accept for review. It is 
noteworthy that the Court rejected the U.S. government’s arguments in a 
number of immigration cases.370 It is difficult to discern significantly 
different treatment of immigration matters by the Court and any deviation 
from conventional legal doctrines. 
For its part, although taking aggressive positions in the high Court, the 
executive branch under President Obama does not zealously invoke the 
plenary power doctrine in an attempt to justify its policies in the way that 
the Bush administration did with respect to the adoption of the 
extraordinary “special registration” program directed at Arab and Muslim 
noncitizens.371 In fact, the Obama administration took the rare step in 
Kucana v. Holder of refusing to defend a court of appeals ruling in its favor 
that the courts lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen 
removal proceedings.372 Consistent with past precedent, the Court 
ultimately held that motions to reopen were subject to judicial review 
(although that review continues to be quite deferential).373 
                                                                                                                 
 369. See supra Parts II.C, IV.C, V.B.  
 370. See, e.g., supra Part III.B (analyzing Judulang v. Holder); Part IV.A (analyzing 
Moncrieffe v. Holder). 
 371. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. One exception to this rule was in the 2014 
Term in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) in which the U.S. government vigorously 
defended without reservation the doctrine of consular nonreviewablity, an outgrowth of the 
plenary power doctrine. See Kevin R. Johnson, Argument Preview: The Doctrine of Consular 
Non-Reviewability–Historical Relic or Good Law?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2015, 9:55 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/argument-preview-the-doctrine-of-consular-non-reviewa 
bility-historical-relic-or-good-law/. 
 372. See supra Part I.C (analyzing Kucana v. Holder).  The Solicitor General later made 
a similar decision not to defend another court of appeal’s ruling restricting jucidial review in 
a motion to reopen case.  See Mata v. Lynch 135 S. Ct. 2154 (2015). 
 373. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (citing, inter alia, Gutierrez de Martinez 
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995)). 
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Students of immigration law who have been well-schooled in the plenary 
power doctrine may find the unexceptional nature of the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary immigration decisions to be surprising.374 The truth of the 
matter is that the impact of that exceptional doctrine on the Roberts Court’s 
immigration jurisprudence appears to be, at most, negligible.  
It indeed is most surprising that neither the Court under Chief Justice 
Roberts nor the U.S. government under the leadership of President Obama, 
have paid much attention to the plenary power doctrine. Instead of 
deviating from ordinary judicial review principles, the Court has 
consistently reviewed the immigration decisions of the executive branch in 
a manner strikingly similar to its scrutiny of the decisions of other 
administrative agencies. This pattern suggests that the doctrine fits 
uncomfortably in modern American jurisprudence.  
Observers can draw several basic practical lessons of advocacy from the 
Roberts Court’s immigration decisions. One is that the Court in the ordinary 
immigration case in fact independently reviews the specific rulings of the 
BIA. At times, the Court has flatly rejected the BIA’s positions.375 Under 
traditional notions of agency deference, the Roberts Court has not hesitated 
to reverse removal decisions that it concludes are based on erroneous 
readings of the immigration statute.376  
At the same time, the Court is ready and willing, when the immigration 
provision in question is ambiguous, to apply ordinary administrative law 
doctrines and defer to what it determines to be reasonable interpretations of 
statutory ambiguity by the BIA.377 It, however, has not applied any form of 
deference to agency immigration decisions even vaguely resembling the 
blanket deference called for by an unvarnished version of the plenary power 
doctrine.  
Over at least the last decade, the Court has followed a consistent pattern 
with respect to deference to the BIA, with a rather unextraordinary body of 
immigration jurisprudence emerging as a result. That is not to suggest that 
the Court’s decisions have gone uncriticized, which is not the case. 
Commentators regularly question the Court’s interpretation of the laws, 
                                                                                                                 
 374. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11. 
 375. See, e.g., supra Part III.B (analyzing the Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, 
which found the BIA’s ruling to be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and therefore 
unworthy of deference); supra Part IV.A (analyzing Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v. 
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 376. See, e.g., id. 
 377. See supra Part III.E (discussing the Court’s decision in Holder v. Gutierrez); supra 
Part V.A (analyzing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio). 
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deference to the agency, and application of generally applicable legal 
doctrines.378 Still, the Court’s immigration jurisprudence sits firmly in the 
jurisprudential mainstream, generally consistent with other bodies of 
substantive law. 
As is common in its approach to other bodies of law, the Roberts Court 
ordinarily begins by engaging in rigorous analysis of the text of the 
immigration statute.379 Immigration attorneys should take note of the 
Court’s careful attention to statutory construction, which is important given 
the well-known complexities of the Immigration and Nationality Act.380 
Ultimately, immigration attorneys should expect ordinary—but not in 
any way extreme—deference by the Supreme Court to BIA interpretations 
of the immigration laws. As mentioned previously, the classic plenary 
power doctrine does not appear to meaningfully influence the Court’s 
review of ordinary BIA decisions. Calls for extraordinary deference rarely 
come up in the run-of-the-mill removal case, in which the Court focuses on 
parsing the language of the immigration laws and deciding on the 
appropriate deference to the agency. 
The Supreme Court has also embraced a mainstream approach in its 
decisions involving federal preemption of state and local immigration 
enforcement laws, which state and local governments have enacted with 
regularity in recent years.381 The Court has done so despite the volatile 
political tensions over immigration enforcement and the heated controversy 
surrounding state and local immigration enforcement laws. The two merits 
decisions in the 2009-13 Terms deciding federal preemption of these kinds 
of laws reach contrary conclusions based on a straightforward interpretation 
of the statutory text of the immigration laws.382 Those decisions clarified 
the appropriate approach to federal preemption of state immigration 
enforcement laws and left little doubt about, consistent with past precedent, 
                                                                                                                 
 378. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 147-48 (citing authorities criticizing 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting); supra note 306 (citing authorities criticizing Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chaidez v. United States). 
 379. See, e.g., supra Part I.B (analyzing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder); supra Part III.C 
(analyzing Kawashima v. Holder). 
 380. “With only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed 
‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.’” Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 821 F.2d 
1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(observing that the Immigration and Nationality Act resembles “King Mino’s labyrinth in 
ancient Crete”); see, e.g., supra Part V.A (analyzing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio and the 
complexities of the statutory provision in question).  
 381. See supra Parts II.A, Part III.A. 
 382. See supra Parts II.A, Part III.A. 
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the primacy of federal power over immigration. Following its standard 
review practice, the Court also declined to review lower court decisions 
invalidating the core of the Alabama, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers 
Branch, Texas (and upholding much of the Fremont, Nebraska) 
immigration enforcement laws.383  
Beyond the fact that the decisions fit comfortably into the mainstream, 
the Supreme Court’s body of immigration decisions is difficult to 
categorize. The Court generally approaches each case on a factually and 
legally specific basis and applies conventional legal norms of statutory 
construction, agency deference, retroactivity analysis, and federal 
preemption doctrine. The Court’s approach generally lacks ideological 
heavy-handedness, with a few isolated exceptions in opinions by individual 
Justices. Justice Scalia’s high-pitched dissent in Arizona v. United States 
arguably represents the exception that proves the general rule.384  
Immigrants generally have won more than they have lost in the Supreme 
Court in the 2009-13 Terms. Such an outcome is not what one might predict 
from a Court led by a conservative Chief Justice, laws that have grown 
increasingly tough on immigrants385 and the considerable deference 
generally accorded to administrative agencies.386 That immigrants prevailed 
so frequently might be the most surprising—and telling—characteristic of 
the Roberts Court’s immigration decisions. 
B. Rejection of a More Protective Immigration Jurisprudence 
More than twenty years ago,387 I criticized a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that employed generally applicable principles of statutory 
construction and administrative law in the review of agency immigration 
decisions and found against the noncitizens.388 The thrust of the argument 
was that, given the weighty life and liberty issues at stake in immigration 
cases, including possible removal from the United States, the lack of direct 
political accountability of administrative agencies to noncitizens who 
                                                                                                                 
 383. See supra Parts II.C, IV.C, V.B. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92. 
 385. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 67-77 (discussing the focus of 
contemporary removal efforts on immigrants convicted of crimes). 
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cannot vote, and evidence of a consistently high incidence of error and 
possible bias in the immigration bureaucracy,389 courts should engage in 
more exacting judicial review of agency immigration decisions to ensure 
compliance with the law, fundamental fairness, and due consideration of the 
life and liberty interests at stake.  
The Supreme Court, generally speaking, has not embraced anything 
resembling “hard look” review of the immigration decisions of the 
executive branch.390 Rather, it instead has consistently opted for standard 
judicial review of immigration decisions similar to that generally accorded 
administrative agencies. Even if disappointed by the Court’s rejection of 
more exacting judicial review, scholars should view positively the 
consistent individualized review of agency immigration decisions and the 
application of ordinary, not exceptional, deference principles to the rulings 
of the BIA. 
Conclusion 
A review of the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions in the 2009-13 
Terms reveals that, as a practical matter, the Roberts Court’s conservative 
judicial philosophy has meant review of immigration cases through 
application of mainstream transsubstantive legal principles. That form of 
review contrasts sharply with the judicial hands-off approach popular on the 
Supreme Court in the heyday of the plenary power doctrine.391  
Nor is there reason to believe that, absent unforeseeable developments, 
the Court’s approach to immigration cases will change much in the near 
future. The Justices seem firmly wedded to a mainstream interpretation and 
application of the U.S. immigration laws.  
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the Supreme Court will 
continue to review immigration cases in a similar fashion. This is true even 
if the Court’s ideological composition changes. More liberal appointments 
might be predicted to lead to somewhat less deference to the BIA and a 
further move away from immigration exceptionalism. However, increased 
deference, or a revival of the plenary power doctrine, would appear much 
less likely with a more liberal Court and its likely predisposition to 
                                                                                                                 
 389. See Johnson, supra note 387, at 442-54; see also Kevin R. Johnson, A “Hard Look” 
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meaningful constitutional review of the immigration laws to ensure that 
agency decisions are consistent with the immigration statute.   
Conversely, it seems unlikely that the addition of more conservative 
Justices to the Court would result in a return to a full-fledged plenary power 
regime, or anything resembling immigration exceptionalism. Additional 
conservative Justices would likely result in reinforcing the current trend of 
the Court’s unexceptional and unremarkable immigration jurisprudence. 
However, greater deference to the immigration bureaucracy under generally 
applicable administrative law doctrines might be expected. 
In sum, the current trajectory of this Court’s immigration cases suggests 
that, absent unexpected developments, the trend toward a normalized and 
unexceptional immigration jurisprudence is likely to continue. Immigration 
exceptionalism—and, with it, the Chinese Exclusion Case—after 125 years 
appears to slowly but surely be on its way out. 
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